[Aikido] Fix 5 security issues in @tiptap/core, dompurify - #640
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[Aikido] Fix 5 security issues in @tiptap/core, dompurify#640aikido-autofix[bot] wants to merge 3 commits into
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Upgrade @tiptap/core and dompurify to fix prototype pollution XSS and event handler execution vulnerabilities in sanitization.
✅ No breaking changes for: dompurify
✅ 5 CVEs resolved by this upgrade
This PR will resolve the following CVEs:
mergeAttributes()helper is vulnerable to prototype pollution via untrusted attribute objects, allowing attackers to inject malicious DOM attributes through XSS when content is serialized as ProseMirror output.mergeAttributes()helper allows attackers to inject malicious properties into object prototypes via__proto__keys in document data, leading to arbitrary JavaScript execution when attributes are rendered in the DOM.IN_PLACEoption enabled, enabling arbitrary code execution after sanitization completes when pending resource events fire.🤖 Remediation details
Fix security vulnerabilities in
@tiptap/coreanddompurifyBoth vulnerable packages are declared as direct dependencies in
ui/vuetifyx/vuetifyxjs/package.json. Bumping their declared version ranges and runningpnpm install --lockfile-onlywas sufficient to resolve all affected instances inpnpm-lock.yaml. No overrides were required.@tiptap/core
@tiptap/corewas declared at^3.30.2and resolved to3.30.2, which falls within the vulnerable range>=2.0.0 <=3.30.3. The declared specifier inpackage.jsonwas raised to^3.30.4(the patched floor), causing pnpm to resolve the package to3.30.6in the lockfile. The sibling package@tiptap/vue-3was declared at the same^3.30.2range and moved to^3.30.4in the same edit, as both belong to the same tiptap release group and share a version range by design.dompurify
dompurifywas declared at^3.4.12and resolved to3.4.12, which is below the patched floor of3.4.14. The declared specifier inpackage.jsonwas raised to^3.4.14, and pnpm resolved the package to3.4.14in the lockfile, clearing all three advisories that targeted this package.Version changes
@tiptap/core^3.30.2(resolved3.30.2)^3.30.4(resolved3.30.6)@tiptap/vue-3^3.30.2(resolved3.30.2)^3.30.4(resolved3.30.6)@tiptap/coredompurify^3.4.12(resolved3.4.12)^3.4.14(resolved3.4.14)