Independent investigative reporting, open-source intelligence (OSINT) documentation, and public-interest research tracking critical digital infrastructure, state surveillance procurement, foreign influence operations, and cybersecurity governance across Southeastern Europe and the Western Balkans.

• Official Publication Platform: Digital Power Investigation on Medium

An exhaustive investigative report examining Dražen Višnjić, director of the Agency for Information and Communication Technologies of Republika Srpska (AIKT) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the political-security patronage network operating under Milorad Dodik.

• Full English Report (Medium): Dodik’s Digital Insider: The Secret Deals and Russian Ties of Dražen Višnjić
• Full Bosnian/Serbian Report (Medium): Dodikov digitalni insajder: Tajni poslovi i ruske veze Dražena Višnjića

• English Executive Summary & Entity Index: drazen-visnjic-dodiks-digital-insider-aikt-investigation.md
• Bosnian/Serbian Executive Summary & Entity Index: drazen-visnjic-dodikov-digitalni-insajder-aikt-istraga.md

Republika Srpska is one of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s two administrative entities, situated directly on the external border of the European Union. Decisions regarding its critical information infrastructure impact public institutions, citizens' private data, regional telecommunications, and cross-border financial channels.

Appointed in February 2024 to lead the newly established Agency for Information and Communication Technologies (AIKT), Dražen Višnjić brought a background spanning military academy training in Belgrade, police telecommunications interception, international cybercrime cooperation, corporate directorships, and senior political advisory roles under Milorad Dodik. Rather than establishing transparent, auditable European cybersecurity standards, AIKT under Višnjić’s leadership became the operational hub for a series of opaque contracts and geopolitical alignments.

Following U.S. Treasury sanctions that crippled Milorad Dodik’s domestic IT patronage network and triggered the December 2023 collapse of Republika Srpska’s Integrated Health Information System (IZIS) alongside dark-web leaks of Tax Administration records, the entity government pivoted to Beijing.

• The Contract: In May 2024, authorities quietly signed a 10-year, BAM 57 million software and infrastructure contract with ELINC (China Electronics International Corporation), a subsidiary of state-owned defense conglomerate China Electronics Corporation (CEC).
• Defense & Surveillance Profile: CEC was placed on the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) Non-SDN Chinese Military-Industrial Complex Companies List under an executive order targeting surveillance technology exported outside China to monitor citizens and facilitate repression. ELINC previously debuted in the Balkans at the 2023 Belgrade arms fair, showcasing radar-jamming and electronic-warfare systems.
• The Tripartite Model: Višnjić publicly defended the rollout across 15 core locations and 780 public institutions (with data centers at the Faculty of Electrical Engineering in East Sarajevo and backup support in Kragujevac, Serbia). He explicitly defined the architecture as a combination of Chinese hardware and software, Russian organizational mechanisms of "control and supervision," and Israeli technical training.
• Absence of Oversight: When questioned by journalists on what independent mechanism would prevent political abuse or unlawful surveillance, Višnjić admitted that an oversight model was merely "under consideration"—months after public funds were already committed.

Despite AIKT’s legal mandate to protect information security and public data integrity, the agency actively courted Kremlin-linked information-warfare operatives.

• The Agreement: On June 17, 2024, Russia’s Rybar network announced that its head, Mikhail Zvinchuk, and AIKT director Dražen Višnjić had agreed on bilateral cooperation in the Balkans.
• Institutional Confirmation: In July 2024, AIKT officially confirmed to investigative reporters at Detektor (BIRN) that it planned formal cooperation with Zvinchuk, including establishing a "media school" and joint academic initiatives with local faculties.
• Sanctions Context: Zvinchuk and Rybar are sanctioned by the European Union for undermining the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine and operate as a primary Kremlin influence instrument funded via Russian state-military channels.

In August 2025, investigative outlet CAPITAL.ba exposed an official questionnaire circulated to public institutions directly from an institutional AIKT email address (@aikt.vladars.rs), ostensibly mapping IT cooperation with Russia’s Nizhny Novgorod region.

• Financial Workarounds: Beyond routine fiber-optic and data-center questions, the document systematically probed Republika Srpska’s legal and financial capacity to facilitate sanctions evasion for Russian tech companies.
• Alternative Channels: Specific inquiries targeted alternative banking settlement channels via China and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), intermediary re-export routes into the European Union via Serbia and Turkey, and institutional payment mechanisms utilizing cryptocurrencies and stablecoins.
• Unaccounted Infrastructure: While AIKT publicly denied authoring the document and Investment-Development Bank (IRB RS) leadership later claimed association with the Russian outreach, AIKT never released server logs, email headers, or an internal incident audit explaining how an official cybersecurity agency inbox distributed a Russian sanctions-evasion blueprint.

On June 7, 2024, just weeks after the secret Chinese contract was signed, AIKT launched a BAM 1 million (excluding VAT) framework tender for a 12-month media advertising campaign.

• Procedural Manipulation: Procurement watchdog Pratimo Tendere and investigative portal Gerila discovered that the million-mark item did not exist in AIKT’s original procurement schedule. The budget amendment was inserted into the public procurement plan just 12 minutes before the tender notice was published.
• Tailored Specifications: Bidders were required to maintain television studio facilities across three specific cities (Banja Luka, East Sarajevo, and Trebinje), deploy five filming crews, five editing suites, and drone equipment, and prove prior contracts worth at least BAM 1 million—criteria matching the exact operational footprint of broadcasters affiliated with Alternativna Televizija (ATV), a media outlet sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury in January 2022 as part of Milorad Dodik’s corruption network.

Višnjić’s appointment to AIKT followed a documented 15-year pattern inside Republika Srpska’s security and political apparatus:

• Interior Ministry Wiretapping Operations (2011): Entering the RS Ministry of Interior (MUP RS) around 2008 after graduating from the Belgrade Military Academy and serving in the Armed Forces of BiH, Višnjić was placed at the controls of BAM 4 million in surveillance and interception hardware acquired from Belgrade-based Vizus (largely funded through Dodik’s presidential budget). Investigative reporting by Slobodan Vasković documented how the system extracted call records directly from the m:tel network without judicial warrants, and how Višnjić—protected by presidential security adviser Miloš Čubrilović and relative Zoran Mandić—expanded interception playback access across more computers than licensed. When unit supervisor Zlatan Mitić objected, Mitić was removed and Višnjić was promoted.
• FBI Commendation vs. Internal Criminal Inquiry (2016–2017): In May 2016, Višnjić and five colleagues in the MUP RS high-tech crime unit received an FBI commendation for the international "Port Royal" cybercrime operation. However, by October 2017, after Višnjić and four subordinates abruptly resigned, the MUP RS Organized Crime Directorate launched a prosecutorial inquiry into the unit. Investigators examined the handling of FBI-donated hardware (10 iPhones, 4 iPads, 7 laptops) and a USD 30,000 server payment, alongside allegations that data from court-warranted undercover online surveillance had been illegally copied onto external hard drives outside the judicial chain of custody. State Prosecutor Diana Kajmaković also filed an official dispatch noting that Višnjić’s unit had shared investigative data with German police without her authorization. Crucially, the complaint targeted Višnjić’s unreported trips to Russia and Switzerland in 2015 and 2016. The inquiry vanished into prosecutorial silence as Višnjić moved directly into Milorad Dodik’s office as a presidential adviser.
• The BAM 6 Million "Dulin" Sepsis Patent (2020): In November 2020, BN Television exposed a scheme in which the RS Ministry of Health and the Investment-Development Bank (IRB RS) wired BAM 6 million in three tranches to the private account of San Diego physician Dušan Ninkov for a 25% stake in "Dulin," a purported sepsis treatment never tested on humans. The corporate vehicle registered in Banja Luka, Tesla Bioscience a.d., was co-owned by the RS Government, Ninkov, and Belgrade-based Iris Institut—whose director was Dražen Višnjić and whose owner was Dragan Vasiljević (a notorious Dodik associate linked to the collapse of the Farmland cattle farm and the looting of over BAM 18 million from IRB RS and the entity’s Commodity Reserves). To date, no working medication or financial return has ever been accounted for to taxpayers.

• Key Individuals: Dražen Višnjić, Milorad Dodik, Mikhail Zvinchuk (Mihail Zvinčuk), Dragan Vasiljević, Dušan Ninkov, Miloš Čubrilović, Siniša Kostrešević, Zoran Mandić, Stanislav Čađo, Diana Kajmaković, Zora Vidović, Željko Budimir, Denis Turkanović, Zlatan Mitić.
• Agencies & Institutions: Agency for Information and Communication Technologies of Republika Srpska (AIKT / Agencija za informaciono-komunikacione tehnologije RS), Government of Republika Srpska (Vlada RS), Ministry of Interior of Republika Srpska (MUP RS), Investment-Development Bank of Republika Srpska (IRB RS), Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC - U.S. Treasury), Prosecutor's Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Tužilaštvo BiH).
• Corporations & Operatives: ELINC (China Electronics International Corporation), China Electronics Corporation (CEC), Rybar (Russian information-warfare network), Vizus (Belgrade), Tesla Bioscience a.d. (Banja Luka), Iris Institut (Belgrade), Alternativna Televizija (ATV), A Media.

1. CAPITAL.ba (Oct 10, 2025): Confirmed: Srpska Pays China, Russia, and Israel to Control the Internet
2. CAPITAL.ba (Aug 11, 2025): Russians Probe Sanctions Evasion and Crypto Payments in Republika Srpska
3. Detektor / BIRN (Nov 5, 2024): Russia’s Rybar and Republika Srpska Authorities Launch Media School of Propaganda
4. CAPITAL.ba (Jul 26, 2024): Owner of ELINC, With Which RS Signed Secret Contract, Is on OFAC List
5. CAPITAL.ba (Jul 24, 2024): Confirmed: Chinese Awarded Largest ICT Project in History of Srpska Across 780 Institutions
6. CAPITAL.ba (Jul 23, 2024): Srpska Secretly Signed BAM 57M Contract with Chinese Firm Linked to Military Industry
7. Gerila.info / Pratimo Tendere (Jun 10, 2024): One Million Marks for Media Advertising of AIKT RS
8. U.S. Department of the Treasury (Jan 5, 2022): Treasury Sanctions Milorad Dodik and Associated Media Platform for Corruption
9. RTV BN (Nov 6, 2020): Regime Insiders Took BAM 6,000,000 for Fabricated Testing of Non-Existent Sepsis Drug
10. CAPITAL.ba (Oct 27, 2017): Dodik’s Adviser Targeted by RS Interior Ministry Investigation
11. RTV BN / SrpskaCafe (Oct 27, 2017): Police Inquiry Following Resignations and Unreported Trips