Report it privately through GitHub: the repository's Security tab, then Report a vulnerability. Please don't open a public issue. Say what is affected, how to reproduce it, and what an attacker gains.
These pages promise that nothing from an index is used before it is verified. A way around any of these checks is a vulnerability:
- the publication's Ed25519 signature, and its key's lookup in the ar.io
gateway registry through a different gateway
(
packages/index-client/src/publication.ts); - the range reader's check of every piece against the BitTorrent v2 hash tree
the signed publication pins (
packages/index-client/src/range/); - the SHA-256 pins on the DuckDB-WASM engine and its worker
(
engine.lock.json); - the size check and the "not covered by the signature" label on names taken from ArDrive record JSON;
- the release gate: a deploy that ships bytes other than the ones
scripts/release.mjs verifyrecorded.
The index formats and the gateways that publish them are maintained in ar-io/ar-io-node; report problems with them there.