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v0.74.0 Bastion: Admin → Security rewritten — posture score, unknown never OK, audited host changes - #185
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Audits the Full RMM Functionality Expansion directive against 0.73.0 source, migrations, tests and flags: docs/rmm-expansion-audit.md (in /docs) with a status and strongest-evidence matrix (136 rows), related work (MSA steps 2-5 behind MSA_GRANTS off; #183 and #185 in progress), thirteen conflicts with existing invariants, the P0 sequence as eight PR-sized releases (0.75.0-0.82.0), P1/P2, and a needs-real-device list. Corrects stale statements in implementation-status.md, capabilities.md and rmm-gap-analysis.md. No code, migration, agent or signer change. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
agit8or1
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Audits the Full RMM Functionality Expansion directive against 0.73.0 source, migrations, tests and flags: docs/rmm-expansion-audit.md (in /docs) with a status and strongest-evidence matrix (136 rows), related work (MSA steps 2-5 behind MSA_GRANTS off; #183 and #185 in progress), thirteen conflicts with existing invariants, the P0 sequence as eight PR-sized releases (0.75.0-0.82.0), P1/P2, and a needs-real-device list. Corrects stale statements in implementation-status.md, capabilities.md and rmm-gap-analysis.md. No code, migration, agent or signer change. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
agit8or1
added a commit
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Nov 20, 2026
Audits the Full RMM Functionality Expansion directive against 0.73.0 source, migrations, tests and flags: docs/rmm-expansion-audit.md (in /docs) with a status and strongest-evidence matrix (136 rows), related work (MSA steps 2-5 behind MSA_GRANTS off; #183 and #185 in progress), thirteen conflicts with existing invariants, the P0 sequence as eight PR-sized releases (0.75.0-0.82.0), P1/P2, and a needs-real-device list. Corrects stale statements in implementation-status.md, capabilities.md and rmm-gap-analysis.md. No code, migration, agent or signer change. Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…never OK, audited and confirmed host changes The page reported failures as healthy: ESLint linted nothing on dist and semgrep never started, both shown as "no issues"; "Fix" ran npm audit fix in production's node_modules; "Renew" re-posted Caddy's unchanged config; a failed fail2ban or apt read showed Stopped / up to date; fail2ban changes were unaudited, unconfirmed, and a failed install reported success; GeoIP and IP lists were stored and never enforced. Now: one exec site with a closed argv list matching the installer's sudoers (sudo -n, no sudoers change), every change Platform Admin + assertFresh (server.security / login.lockout) + HOST_SECURITY_CHANGED or LOGIN_POLICY_CHANGED with its outcome (migration 0091), and an Overview posture over SSH, firewall, ports, updates, restart, fail2ban, certificates, headers, MFA coverage, API keys, audit chain, signer and the API's off switches, scored only over what could be read. Tests: unit-host-security (80, in CI), e2e-host-security (104, ports 3991-3993, fixture host), e2e-ui tabs, invariant §84. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Admin → Security, rewritten (0.74.0 · Bastion)
The page at
/admin/securityreported failures as healthy. This rewrites it around one rule: a check whose source cannot be read is Unknown, never OK. Every change it makes to the host is now Platform Admin only, may ask the person to confirm it is them, and is audited with its outcome.Bugs fixed (symptom → cause → fix)
dist/outside its base path, ignored every file, and nobody checked the empty result. semgrep is a snap that the service's PATH andProtectHomecannot reach. The checkout path was hard-coded. → Both removed (CI does source scanning). A Dependencies tab now runsnpm audit --omit=dev, and when it cannot run it says Unknown and gives the reason.npm audit fixin production'snode_modules→ this bypassed the generated manifest → removed.tls.connectover loopback using SNI.HOST_SECURITY_CHANGEDwith its outcome. Banning your own address is refused.Features added
MSA_GRANTS,NODE_ENV, and every*_SWEEP/*_SEALERoff switch.sudo rem0te-signed-statusinstead.server.securityandlogin.lockout, both defaulting toofflike every key.docs/server-security.md(in the bundle ORDER), plus/help, the README index, CLAUDE.md §84 and a regenerated API-REFERENCE (636 routes, checked against the runtime table).Owner action needed (found read-only on the production host as
reboot)PermitRootLogin yesis set insshd_config, and50-cloud-init.confis unreadable, so the effective value is unknown. Check it withsudo sshd -T | grep -i permitrootlogin.sshdjail watches_SYSTEMD_UNIT=sshd.service, but Ubuntu 24.04 runsssh.service, so the jail has seen 0 failures. Fix: injail.local, setjournalmatch = _SYSTEMD_UNIT=ssh.service + _COMM=sshd, then restart fail2ban.Server: Caddy, and there is noPermissions-Policyheader.0091_server_security_audit, thenprisma generateat the target. Sudoers is unchanged.Tests
unit-host-security.mjs: 80 passed (added to CI).e2e-host-security.mjs: 104 passed on a scratch DB, using ports 3991–3993 and a fixture host (added torun-e2e.sh).e2e-ui.mjs: newserverSecuritystep covering every tab, no console errors, and nothing Unknown labelled OK.check-security-invariants.mjs: new §84 section, all hold.check-versions.mjs: passes.pnpm lint: 0 errors.next buildandnest buildare clean.Not merged or deployed.
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