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Security: Streamline-HQ/streamline-subsonic-ext

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Supported versions

Version Supported
Latest release ✅
Anything older ❌

streamline-subsonic is maintained by one person. Fixes land in a new patch release on top of the latest version; older releases are not backported. Upgrade before reporting.

Reporting a vulnerability

Do not open a public issue.

Use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting: Report a vulnerability. If that is unavailable to you, email dev@antoine-langlois.net instead.

Please include:

  • The extension version and the Streamline version it runs on
  • What an attacker can do: act as another account, get past a permission, reach a file outside the music library, run ffmpeg with arguments of their choosing, etc.
  • Steps to reproduce, ideally with the app and the request it sends (passwords and tokens redacted)

Expect an acknowledgement within a week and a fix or a decision within 30 days for anything exploitable. This is a spare-time project, not a vendor with an on-call rotation: if something is actively being exploited, say so up front and I will prioritise it. I will credit you in the advisory and the release notes unless you'd rather stay anonymous.

Please give me a chance to ship a fix before disclosing publicly. There is no bug bounty.

Scope

In scope: anything that breaks the security model of the extension on a correctly configured Streamline:

  • Authentication bypass on /extensions/subsonic/rest, or a locked account or one without a Subsonic password getting in
  • Getting past an account's permissions (stream, download, playlists, shares, rating, password change, maximum bit rate)
  • One account reading or changing another's playlists, play queue, bookmarks, stars, ratings or shares
  • A public share page serving more than was shared, or after it expired
  • ffmpeg argument injection. The extension holds Streamline's ffmpeg permission, which is full trust: anything a request can slip into an ffmpeg command line runs with Streamline's own rights
  • A stream, download or cover reaching a file outside the music library
  • SQL injection through any parameter
  • Supply-chain issues in the release pipeline: the published subsonic.wasm not matching its checksum or this repository's source

Out of scope:

  • Vulnerabilities in Streamline itself (the extension host, its sandbox, its views): report those to Streamline.
  • Weaknesses of the Subsonic protocol itself: the p parameter, enc: hex and md5(password + salt) tokens are what the apps speak. That is why the Subsonic password is separate from the login password.
  • The API over plain HTTP. Streamline is built to sit behind TLS.
  • Vulnerabilities in Subsonic apps. Report those upstream.
  • Scanner or agent output with no demonstrated path to exploitation.

There aren't any published security advisories