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Security: Streamline-HQ/streamline-player-ext

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Supported versions

Version Supported
main ✅

There is no release yet: fixes land on main. streamline-player-ext is maintained by one person.

Reporting a vulnerability

Do not open a public issue.

Use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting: Report a vulnerability. If that is unavailable to you, email dev@antoine-langlois.net instead.

Please include:

  • The commit you built and the Streamline version it runs on
  • What an attacker can do: sign in as someone else, pair a TV to another account, play or download a title without credentials, read another account's watch state, etc.
  • Steps to reproduce, ideally with the requests involved (tokens and secrets redacted)

Expect an acknowledgement within a week and a fix or a decision within 30 days for anything exploitable. This is a spare-time project, not a vendor with an on-call rotation: if something is actively being exploited, say so up front and I will prioritise it. I will credit you in the advisory unless you'd rather stay anonymous.

Please give me a chance to ship a fix before disclosing publicly. There is no bug bounty.

Scope

In scope: anything that breaks the security model of the extension on a correctly configured Streamline:

  • The sign-in flow at /authorize: authorization codes, PKCE, redirect_uri checks against player.origins, open redirects
  • Device pairing: approving a TV for an account that did not ask for it, guessing or replaying a pairing code
  • Device keys and access tokens: one that outlives its revocation, one account using another's, a token leaking into a log or a response
  • Playback tokens and the engine secret: minting a playback token for a title or session that is not yours, the secret leaking past Server settings
  • One account reading or changing another's devices, sessions, watch state, activity or downloads, or a member reaching the admin routes
  • A path the extension hands the engine or serves itself reaching a file outside the granted library folders
  • SQL injection through any parameter

Out of scope:

  • Vulnerabilities in Streamline itself (the extension host, its sandbox, its views): report those to Streamline.
  • Vulnerabilities in the player apps or the engine: report those to streamline-player.
  • The API over plain HTTP. Streamline is built to sit behind TLS.
  • Anything requiring existing admin credentials. Admins set the origins and the engine secret by design.
  • Scanner or agent output with no demonstrated path to exploitation.

There aren't any published security advisories