| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
main |
✅ |
There is no release yet: fixes land on main. streamline-player-ext is
maintained by one person.
Do not open a public issue.
Use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting: Report a vulnerability. If that is unavailable to you, email dev@antoine-langlois.net instead.
Please include:
- The commit you built and the Streamline version it runs on
- What an attacker can do: sign in as someone else, pair a TV to another account, play or download a title without credentials, read another account's watch state, etc.
- Steps to reproduce, ideally with the requests involved (tokens and secrets redacted)
Expect an acknowledgement within a week and a fix or a decision within 30 days for anything exploitable. This is a spare-time project, not a vendor with an on-call rotation: if something is actively being exploited, say so up front and I will prioritise it. I will credit you in the advisory unless you'd rather stay anonymous.
Please give me a chance to ship a fix before disclosing publicly. There is no bug bounty.
In scope: anything that breaks the security model of the extension on a correctly configured Streamline:
- The sign-in flow at
/authorize: authorization codes, PKCE,redirect_urichecks againstplayer.origins, open redirects - Device pairing: approving a TV for an account that did not ask for it, guessing or replaying a pairing code
- Device keys and access tokens: one that outlives its revocation, one account using another's, a token leaking into a log or a response
- Playback tokens and the engine secret: minting a playback token for a title or session that is not yours, the secret leaking past Server settings
- One account reading or changing another's devices, sessions, watch state, activity or downloads, or a member reaching the admin routes
- A path the extension hands the engine or serves itself reaching a file outside the granted library folders
- SQL injection through any parameter
Out of scope:
- Vulnerabilities in Streamline itself (the extension host, its sandbox, its views): report those to Streamline.
- Vulnerabilities in the player apps or the engine: report those to streamline-player.
- The API over plain HTTP. Streamline is built to sit behind TLS.
- Anything requiring existing admin credentials. Admins set the origins and the engine secret by design.
- Scanner or agent output with no demonstrated path to exploitation.