Enable the automatic AI PR reviewer on this repo

.gitattributes

@@ -1 +1,3 @@
 pnpm-lock.yaml binary linguist-generated
+
+.github/workflows/*.lock.yml linguist-generated=true merge=ours

.github/aw/actions-lock.json

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+{
+  "entries": {
+    "github/gh-aw-actions/setup@v0.81.6": {
+      "repo": "github/gh-aw-actions/setup",
+      "version": "v0.81.6",
+      "sha": "ba6380cc6e5be5d21677bebe04d52fb48e3abec7"
+    }
+  }
+}

.github/aw/review/ROUTING

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+# Machine-readable routing for the PR-reviewer workflow. Parsed deterministically by
+# the shared router (workflows/review/lib in this repo; format spec in
+# workflows/review/README.md). One rule per line:
+#   <pattern> [lens=<lens>,...] [tier=trivial|low|medium|high] [direction-dependent]
+#   enable <reviewer>[,<reviewer>...]
+# Later tier rules override earlier ones (gitignore-style); lenses union across
+# matching rules. This file complements risk-classification.md (model-facing prose);
+# team ownership stays in .github/REVIEWERS.
+#
+# No specialist lenses are enabled: the eleven lens prompts target webapp's backend
+# domains (auth resolvers, migrations, federation, ...) and none maps to this repo's
+# supply-chain surface. Whole-change reviewers mirror webapp's eval-justified roster.
+
+enable holistic,completeness,test-adequacy,first-principles,conventions
+
+# Shipped composite actions run inside consuming repos' CI with their credentials.
+actions/**                   tier=high
+# This repo's own CI, the publish pipeline, and the compiled agentic workflows.
+.github/workflows/**         tier=high
+utils/**                     tier=high
+# The shared reviewer's deterministic enforcement layer.
+workflows/review/lib/**      tier=high
+
+# Dev-only surfaces.
+workflows/review/eval/**     tier=low
+**/*.test.ts                 tier=low
+
+# Docs are trivial; agentic-workflow .md files are executable, not docs, so they
+# are re-raised after the broad docs rule (last match wins).
+**/*.md                      tier=trivial
+.changeset/*.md              tier=trivial
+workflows/review/review.md   tier=high
+.github/workflows/*.md       tier=high

.github/aw/review/ci-tooling.md

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+<!--
+Khan/actions-specific list of issues the CI/tooling already catches, so the reviewer
+doesn't flag them. Injected into the shared workflow (workflows/review/review.md in
+this repo) at runtime. Keep this plain Markdown with no GitHub Actions template
+expressions.
+
+CI here is `node-ci.yml` (every PR) plus `check-for-changeset`. The reviewer's value
+is what none of this sees: shell/template injection in action.yml files, publish/tag
+integrity, gh-aw frontmatter security surfaces, and semver-as-behavior-contract
+judgment (see risk-classification.md "What to verify").
+-->
+
+- **Formatting / lint**: `eslint` with `@khanacademy/eslint-config` +
+  `eslint-plugin-prettier` (Prettier runs as a lint rule). Never comment on
+  formatting, import order, or style eslint enforces.
+- **Type errors**: `pnpm typecheck` (`tsc --noEmit`) and `pnpm build`
+  (`tsc -p actions/tsconfig.json`). If it wouldn't typecheck or compile, CI fails.
+- **Unit tests**: `pnpm test --run` (vitest) runs the full suite, including the
+  reviewer lib tests under `workflows/review/lib/` and the eval smoke test.
+- **Action wiring**: `utils/check-action-dependencies.ts` verifies intra-repo
+  `uses:` references between actions; `node-ci.yml` also functionally smoke-tests
+  `filter-files`, `get-changed-files`, and `json-args` against fixed inputs.
+- **Changeset presence**: `check-for-changeset` fails a PR that changes published
+  action code without a changeset (`.github/`, `utils`, and lint configs are
+  excluded). Don't flag a *missing* changeset; DO review whether the changeset's
+  semver level matches the change; CI can't judge that (see risk-classification.md).
+
+### Don't raise these false alarms
+
+- `action.yml` files are not covered by eslint/tsc; but don't flag YAML syntax or
+  schema errors speculatively; a broken action.yml fails its smoke test or the
+  consumer's first use. Focus on injection and logic, not syntax.
+- `.lock.yml` workflow files are compiled output; don't review their contents
+  line-by-line; verify the source `.md` changed with them (pairing check).
+- Vitest tests here import from `node:` builtins and use `memfs`; that's the
+  established pattern, not a smell.

.github/aw/review/config.md

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+---
+# Khan/actions-specific reviewer configuration, merged into the shared review workflow
+# (workflows/review/review.md in this repo) at COMPILE time via its `imports:` field.
+#
+# Only the frontmatter below is merged; this file's markdown body is ignored by
+# `imports:`. This file owns the `add-reviewer` safe output; the repo-specific
+# `allowed-team-reviewers` allowlist and the bot token used to request teams. It is
+# defined ONLY here (never in review.md): gh-aw lets the main workflow override an
+# imported safe-output of the same type, so defining it there would drop the allowlist.
+#
+# This repo also requests reviewers via Gerald (`.github/REVIEWERS`), which routes
+# everything to @Khan/github-actions. This `add-reviewer` runs in addition to Gerald;
+# the shared workflow's Step 8 dedups against teams already requested or reviewed.
+safe-outputs:
+  add-reviewer:
+    target: "triggering"
+    max: 2
+    allowed-team-reviewers:
+      - github-actions
+    github-token: ${{ secrets.KHAN_ACTIONS_BOT_TOKEN }}
+---
+
+<!--
+This file is a compile-time frontmatter import for the shared PR-reviewer workflow.
+Its body is intentionally empty: `imports:` merges frontmatter only.
+-->

.github/aw/review/risk-classification.md

@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+<!--
+Khan/actions-specific risk-tier file patterns AND the deep-checks for the PR-reviewer
+workflow. Injected into the shared workflow (workflows/review/review.md in this repo)
+at runtime. Keep this plain Markdown with no GitHub Actions template expressions;
+gh-aw rejects those inside imported files.
+
+The blast radius in this repo is supply-chain shaped: the composite actions under
+`actions/` and the shared agentic workflows under `workflows/` execute inside OTHER
+Khan repos' CI, with those repos' tokens and secrets, pinned by release tag. The most
+severe changes here don't break this repo; they break or compromise every consumer
+on its next version bump.
+-->
+
+### Generated files are automatically Trivial
+
+- `pnpm-lock.yaml` (marked `linguist-generated` in `.gitattributes`).
+- `.github/workflows/*.lock.yml`; compiled by `gh aw compile` from the sibling
+  `.md` agentic workflow. Don't deep-review compiled lock contents; instead verify
+  the pairing (see "What to verify"). A `.lock.yml` edited **without** a matching
+  `.md` change is a red flag; classify by the manual edit.
+- `actions/*/index.js` bundles produced by the build. A compiled bundle edited
+  without a source change is a red flag.
+
+### High Risk
+
+Runs in consuming repos' CI (with their credentials), or controls what gets
+published to them:
+
+- **Shipped composite actions**: `actions/*/action.yml` and the code they invoke.
+  These execute in webapp/frontend/perseus/etc. CI with those repos' `GITHUB_TOKEN`
+  (and sometimes admin/bot tokens passed as inputs). Injection via untrusted
+  interpolation, a new outbound network call, loosened token handling, or a subtly
+  wrong filter (e.g. `filter-files` matching too much/little gates other repos' CI
+  decisions) all propagate on the next release.
+- **The publish pipeline**: `utils/run-publish.ts`, `utils/check-action-dependencies.ts`,
+  `.github/workflows/release.yml`. Cuts and force-moves the release tags every
+  consumer pins (`<action>-vX`, `review-vX`). A bug can publish the wrong tree to a
+  tag or rewrite a moving major tag out from under consumers.
+- **This repo's workflow files**: `.github/workflows/**`: `permissions:` blocks,
+  secret usage, event triggers, action pinning. The compiled agentic locks
+  (`*.lock.yml`) are generated, but their frontmatter sources (`review.md` here and
+  in `workflows/review/`) define real permission/secret/network surfaces.
+- **The shared PR reviewer**: `workflows/review/review.md` (the prompt IS the
+  reviewer's behavior in every consuming repo; its frontmatter carries security
+  surfaces: `safe-outputs` caps, `allowed-domains`, `network.allowed`, `roles`,
+  `permissions`) and `workflows/review/lib/**` (the deterministic enforcement
+  layer: finding schema, change-provenance gate, verdict computation,
+  investigation cap, routing parser; a bug here silently changes what gets
+  blocked or posted on every consumer PR).
+
+### Medium Risk
+
+- **The eval suite**: `workflows/review/eval/*.ts` (judge, gates, metrics,
+  runner). Dev-only, but it decides which reviewers/lenses "earn their line" in
+  consumer ROUTING files; a wrong judge or gate corrupts those decisions.
+- **Build/lint/type configuration**: `config/`, `types/`, `tsconfig.json`,
+  `.eslintrc.js`, `pnpm-workspace.yaml`: shapes the compiled output of shipped
+  actions.
+- **Staged workflows**: `.github-staging/**` (not yet active, but will be
+  promoted verbatim).
+
+### Low Risk
+
+- Test files (`**/*.test.ts`) and eval corpus fixtures
+  (`workflows/review/eval/corpus/**`).
+- Internal refactors with test coverage; logging/output-formatting tweaks in
+  utils.
+
+### Trivial Risk
+
+- Generated files (above); Markdown docs and READMEs (except
+  `workflows/review/review.md`, which is executable prompt, not docs);
+  `.changeset/*.md` entries; comments/naming/formatting-only changes.
+
+### Disambiguation
+
+- Highest applicable level wins.
+- **Diff direction matters**: read the hunk, not just the path. In gh-aw
+  frontmatter, widening (`allowed-domains` additions, a raised safe-output `max`,
+  a new secret, a permission upgrade, loosening `roles:` or the fork guard) is the
+  risky direction; tightening is usually safe. In an action's `action.yml`, a new
+  input interpolated into a `run:` block is riskier than a removed one.
+- If the PR description justifies a risky change (evaluated against the eval
+  suite, security-reviewed frontmatter, a documented rollback), you may lower the
+  risk one tier but note the justification.
+
+---
+
+## What to verify (CI cannot catch these)
+
+CI here runs eslint/prettier, `tsc`, vitest, a build, changeset presence, and smoke
+tests of a few actions. It has no actionlint/shellcheck, no security scanning, and
+no check that compiled artifacts match their sources. Findings here are candidates
+for **blocking** comments:
+
+**Template injection in composite actions.** Any dollar-brace GitHub Actions
+expression over `inputs.*`, `github.event.*`, or another attacker-influenceable
+value, interpolated directly into a `run:` script or `github-script` body, is a
+command/JS injection in the CONSUMING repo's CI. Require env-var indirection
+(`env:` + `"$VAR"`) for untrusted values. Same check applies to workflow files in
+this repo. (Spelled without the literal expression syntax here because gh-aw
+rejects runtime imports containing it; see this file's header.)
+
+**Action pinning.** Every new or changed `uses:` of a third-party action must be
+pinned to a full commit SHA (with a version comment), not a tag or branch.
+Intra-repo `uses:` references are rewritten at publish; verify a new one is known
+to `utils/check-action-dependencies.ts` conventions.
+
+**Publish/tag integrity.** For `utils/run-publish.ts` and `release.yml` changes:
+verify the tag-rewriting logic still publishes exactly the action's subtree, that
+moving major tags advance only on release, and that a dry-run path stays dry.
+
+**gh-aw frontmatter security surfaces.** For `review.md` (shared or installed):
+treat a widened `allowed-domains` list, a raised safe-output `max`, a new
+`network.allowed` entry, a new secret reference, added `permissions:`, or a
+weakened trigger guard (`if:` fork/branch exclusions, `roles:`) as a security
+regression needing explicit justification in the PR description. This repo is
+public: the fork-PR guard in the installed `.github/workflows/review.md` must not
+be loosened.
+
+**Compiled-artifact pairing.** A change to an agentic `.md` workflow must ship the
+recompiled `.lock.yml` (and vice versa); a change to reviewer `lib/` code that the
+prompt's pinned `gh-aw-review-lib` checkout ref doesn't cover only takes effect on
+the next release; flag a PR that claims immediate effect for a lib change without
+a release/pin bump.
+
+**Reviewer behavior contract.** Semver on the `review` package is a behavior
+contract (see `workflows/review/README.md`): a release that changes reviewer
+behavior must bump the major version. Flag a behavior-changing `workflows/review/`
+change whose changeset is patch/minor, and any change to `lib/finding-schema.ts`'s
+`FINDING_SCHEMA_VERSION` semantics without the version bump.

.github/aw/review/skills.md

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+<!--
+Khan/actions-specific best-practice catalog for the PR-reviewer workflow. Injected at
+runtime into the shared workflow's `skill-auditor` sub-agent (workflows/review/
+review.md in this repo). That agent has no GitHub API access; it reads each entry's
+file directly from its checked-out workspace on disk, so the paths here must match
+real files. Keep this plain Markdown with no GitHub Actions template expressions.
+
+This repo has no `.claude/skills/` catalog; its documented conventions live in two
+READMEs. Audit against those only. A deviation is *blocking* only when it is itself
+a correctness, security, or breaking-change issue; a merely non-idiomatic deviation
+is a non-blocking suggestion. A convention not written in one of the files below is
+not auditable; do not flag from memory or from other Khan repos' conventions.
+-->
+
+### release-and-versioning - `README.md` (repo root)
+
+**Evaluate when:** anything under `actions/` changes, or `utils/run-publish.ts` /
+`.github/workflows/release.yml` change. Covers the monorepo publish model (bare
+tags per action), the changeset flow (a code change to a published action needs a
+changeset; never hand-edit an action's `package.json` version or `CHANGELOG.md`),
+and the dry-run testing convention for the publish pipeline.
+
+### review-workflow-contract - `workflows/review/README.md`
+
+**Evaluate when:** anything under `workflows/review/` changes. Covers the consumer
+configuration contract (which files a consuming repo must provide, and that
+`add-reviewer` lives only in the consumer's `config.md`), the `ROUTING` file format
+and its last-match-wins tier semantics, the model/effort-per-role table, the
+versioning policy (semver as behavior contract; the `pr-reviewer:version` marker),
+and the policy that opt-in reviewers and lenses earn their `ROUTING` line through
+the eval suite.

.github/workflows/node-ci.yml

@@ -117,4 +117,4 @@ jobs:
 
       - uses: ./actions/check-for-changeset
         with:
-          exclude: .github/,utils,.eslintrc.js,.prettierrc.js
+          exclude: .github/,utils,.eslintrc.js,.prettierrc.js,.gitattributes