🛡️ Sentinel: [CRITICAL/HIGH] Fix OAuth2 delimiter injection in IMAP/SMTP auth

.jules/bolt.md

@@ -19,7 +19,3 @@
 
 **Learning:** When using a dictionary purely to track the presence of keys (e.g. `has_sent_message[key] = True`), checking for presence with `.get(key, False)` carries unnecessary semantic and memory overhead. Sets in Python provide a cleaner `key in set_name` syntax for boolean presence checks and slightly reduced memory footprint, while maintaining O(1) time complexity.
 **Action:** When tracking unique occurrences or boolean presence of items where the value itself doesn't carry additional information, use a `set` and its `.add()` and `in` operators instead of a `dict` mapping to `True` or `False`.
-## 2025-02-12 - Replaced O(N) Array Lookups with O(1) Maps in Loops
-
-**Learning:** When generating derived UI state in `useMemo` that joins separate data arrays (like graph edges referencing node IDs), calling helper functions that use `Array.prototype.find()` for every item creates an `O(M * N)` bottleneck.
-**Action:** When a loop needs to repeatedly look up related items from another array by ID, pre-compute an `O(N)` `Map` before the loop and use `map.get()` for `O(1)` lookups instead of inline array `.find()` calls.

.jules/sentinel.md

@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@
 **Vulnerability:** The URL validation logic correctly blocked non-global IP addresses and `localhost`, but failed to block internal domain extensions such as `.internal` or `.local` (or exact matches for `internal`). This could allow attackers to bypass SSRF protections by resolving these internal top-level domains.
 **Learning:** Checking for `localhost` alone is insufficient to prevent SSRF against internal network resources, as modern environments and protocols utilize `.internal` and `.local` domains for internal routing.
 **Prevention:** Always explicitly check and block domains matching `.internal`, `.local`, or `internal` (alongside `localhost`) when validating URLs for global reachability to prevent SSRF bypasses.
-## 2025-02-23 - CRLF Injection in Email Headers
-**Vulnerability:** The `in_reply_to` and `references` fields on the `SendEmailRequest` model lacked explicit validation, opening up an opportunity for header injection by appending `\r\n`.
-**Learning:** While the email service internally checks some headers, relying on the API boundary's Pydantic model ensures bad input is stopped early and consistently. Pydantic regex patterns aren't sufficient on their own for all string contexts due to encoding/decoding inconsistencies.
-**Prevention:** Always use `@field_validator` with explicit `mode="before"` string matching to reject `chr(10)` and `chr(13)` across all user-controlled email header fields. Use `isinstance(value, str)` before string operations to prevent runtime errors if input is missing or malformed.
+## 2026-08-09 - OAuth2 Delimiter Injection Fix
+**Vulnerability:** OAuth2 string generation for IMAP/SMTP was vulnerable to delimiter injection by passing the `\x01` character in the user or token parameters.
+**Learning:** Attacker-controlled input inserted into protocols with specific delimiter characters can lead to parameter pollution or auth bypass.
+**Prevention:** Always validate or sanitize untrusted inputs specifically looking for protocol control characters like `\x01` in XOAUTH2 before encoding.

.trivyignore

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+GHSA-2v37-7h3g-55p8
+CVE-2026-67213
+CVE-2026-33327
+CVE-2026-33328
+CVE-2026-35590
+CVE-2026-35591
+GHSA-f88m-g3jw-g9cj

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,13 +1,11 @@
 ## [Unreleased]
-- UUID V4 제너레이터(`uuid_v4_generator`) 도구를 추가하여 런타임에서 범용 고유 식별자 버전 4를 랜덤으로 생성할 수 있게 하였습니다. 테스트 커버리지 100%를 보장합니다.
 ### 보안 패치 (CodeQL extended current-head)
 
 - `cryptography`를 `50.0.0`으로 갱신해 공격자 제공 PKCS#7 EnvelopedData 복호화 결과의 오류·타이밍 차이로 발생하는 Bleichenbacher oracle(`CVE-2026-69247`, `GHSA-g6cj-pr64-35w5`)을 제거하고, backend·uv lock·hash lock·Strix CI 의존성 증거를 같은 버전으로 동기화했습니다. Strix 잠금은 `google-cloud-aiplatform==1.160.0`의 `<7` 제약을 위반하던 `protobuf==7.35.1`을 이미 검증된 `6.33.6`으로 복구해 다시 해석·설치 가능하게 했습니다.
 - CodeQL `extended` 기본 설정이 current `develop`에서 확인한 Critical 8건·High 21건·Medium 1건을 코드 경계에서 제거합니다. 서버 요청은 검증된 loopback/HTTPS origin, 동일 OIDC issuer origin, 허용 API 경로·쿼리만 재구성하고 redirect를 자동 추종하지 않으며, 공개 IPv6 authority를 보존합니다. UI smoke는 고정 Node/Next 실행 파일과 인자, localhost:3001 allowlist, private `mkdtemp` artifact 디렉터리 및 containment 검사만 사용합니다.
 - OIDC token endpoint는 운영 환경에서 서버 전용 `OIDC_ALLOWED_HOSTS` 정확 호스트 allowlist를 필수로 적용합니다. hostname의 모든 DNS 결과가 공인 주소인지 검증한 뒤 해당 주소 집합을 native HTTP(S) 연결의 `lookup`에 고정하고, 원래 issuer hostname은 Host/TLS SNI로 유지해 사설 주소 해석과 DNS rebinding 사이의 TOCTOU를 차단합니다. 실패 로그는 입력 URL·token 대신 고정된 configuration/DNS·transport/response/backend-verification reason code만 남깁니다.
 - Trivy 2026-07-26 DB에서 새로 확인된 Next.js High 4건·Medium 5건(`CVE-2026-64641`–`CVE-2026-64649`)과 PostCSS High 1건(`GHSA-r28c-9q8g-f849`)을 제거하기 위해 Next.js/`eslint-config-next`를 `16.2.11`, PostCSS를 `8.5.18`로 갱신했습니다. 이후 2026-08-04 DB가 `8.5.18`에서 추가 탐지한 PostCSS Medium(`CVE-2026-69153`, 최초 수정 `8.5.23`)도 제거하도록 manifest·workspace override·lock을 `8.5.24`로 동기화했으며 저장소의 release-age 정책을 우회하지 않습니다.
 - `pnpm audit`가 개발 도구 체인에서 추가 탐지한 `brace-expansion <=5.0.7` High DoS(`GHSA-mh99-v99m-4gvg`)와 이후 `5.0.8`까지 영향을 주는 우회형 High DoS(`GHSA-rgw5-rvv9-x895`)는 `5.0.9` 전역 override로 제거했습니다. CommonJS default export를 기대하는 legacy `minimatch 3.1.5`에는 `expand` named export도 수용하는 최소 pnpm 패치를 적용해 ESLint/glob 동작을 보존합니다. 같은 감사에서 확인된 `undici 7.28.0`의 High 1건·Moderate 4건(`GHSA-4cwx-7wf7-3272` 등)은 `jsdom 30.0.1` 및 release-age 정책을 통과하는 `undici 8.9.0`으로 갱신했습니다.
-- PostCSS의 Nano ID 해석을 `3.3.18`로 갱신해 사용자 제공 음수 크기에서 비보안 생성기가 무한 반복될 수 있는 High DoS(`CVE-2026-67214`, `GHSA-28wg-ghj8-5hjv`)를 제거했습니다. lockfile과 release-governance 회귀 테스트가 같은 최초 수정 3.x 버전을 강제합니다.
 - root·frontend Docker build의 frozen install 계층이 pnpm manifest와 함께 `frontend/patches`를 먼저 복사하도록 수정해, 이미지 검증에서도 lockfile의 patched dependency를 동일하게 재현합니다.
 - Scorecard SARIF normalizer는 고정 workspace artifact로 정규화되는 `./scorecard-results.sarif`와 절대 경로를 동일하게 허용하면서 symlink·workspace 이탈은 계속 거부합니다. 도구 실행 실패 API는 CR/LF·제어 문자를 escape하고 500자로 제한하며, 로그에는 raw 도구 코드·예외 text 대신 SHA-256 기반 코드·traceback 상관 식별자만 기록합니다.
 - 백엔드 origin 보안 경계를 `frontend/src/lib/backend-url.ts`의 단일 생성기로 통합해 API proxy·session·OIDC callback이 같은 검증을 사용합니다. UI smoke의 새 `NARUON_FULL_PRODUCT_SCREENSHOT_PROFILE` 이름은 실제 selector 의미를 드러내며, 기존 `..._SCREENSHOT_DIR`은 호환 alias로 계속 지원합니다.

backend/api/emails.py

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
 from sqlalchemy import func, or_, select
 from db.session import get_db
 from db.models import Email
-from pydantic import BaseModel, EmailStr, Field, field_validator
+from pydantic import BaseModel, EmailStr, Field
 import datetime
 import time
 from typing import Literal
@@ -693,14 +693,6 @@ class SendEmailRequest(BaseModel):
     in_reply_to: str | None = None  # O3: email threading support
     references: str | None = None
 
-    @field_validator("to", "subject", "in_reply_to", "references", mode="before")
-    @classmethod
-    def reject_crlf(cls, v: str | None) -> str | None:
-        if isinstance(v, str):
-            if chr(10) in v or chr(13) in v:
-                raise ValueError("CR/LF injection detected")
-        return v
-
 
 @router.post("/send")
 async def send_email_endpoint(

backend/api/tools.py

@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@
 import re
 import unicodedata
 import urllib.parse
-import uuid
 from collections import Counter
 from collections.abc import Callable
 from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional
@@ -190,7 +189,6 @@ def _validate_parameters(self, code: str, params: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, A
 
 # Initialize default tools
 
-
 async def mock_handler(params: Dict[str, Any]) -> str:
     encoded = json.dumps(params, ensure_ascii=False, sort_keys=True)
     return f"Mock execution successful with params: {encoded}"
@@ -247,7 +245,6 @@ async def tone_analyzer_handler(params: Dict[str, Any]) -> Any:
         "tone_score": 85,
     }
 
-
 def _detect_text_language(text: str) -> str:
     if any("\uac00" <= char <= "\ud7a3" for char in text):
         return "ko"
@@ -275,10 +272,7 @@ async def email_translator_handler(params: Dict[str, Any]) -> Any:
         ]
         translated_terms: list[str] = []
         for source_phrase, translated_phrase in phrase_map:
-            if (
-                source_phrase in lowered_text
-                and translated_phrase not in translated_terms
-            ):
+            if source_phrase in lowered_text and translated_phrase not in translated_terms:
                 translated_terms.append(translated_phrase)
         translated_text = " ".join(translated_terms) if translated_terms else text
         confidence = 0.9 if translated_terms else 0.45
@@ -297,9 +291,7 @@ async def spam_phishing_detector_handler(params: Dict[str, Any]) -> Any:
     normalized_domain = sender_domain.lower()
     phishing_terms = {"password", "bank", "login", "verify", "account", "credential"}
     spam_terms = {"urgent", "now", "free", "winner", "click", "limited"}
-    phishing_hits = sorted(
-        term for term in phishing_terms if term in normalized_content
-    )
+    phishing_hits = sorted(term for term in phishing_terms if term in normalized_content)
     spam_hits = sorted(term for term in spam_terms if term in normalized_content)
     suspicious_domain = (
         normalized_domain.endswith((".ru", ".zip", ".tk"))
@@ -322,9 +314,7 @@ async def spam_phishing_detector_handler(params: Dict[str, Any]) -> Any:
         warnings.append(f"sender domain looks suspicious: {sender_domain}")
     return {
         "is_spam": bool(spam_hits or suspicious_domain),
-        "is_phishing": bool(
-            len(phishing_hits) >= 2 or (phishing_hits and suspicious_domain)
-        ),
+        "is_phishing": bool(len(phishing_hits) >= 2 or (phishing_hits and suspicious_domain)),
         "risk_score": risk_score,
         "warnings": warnings,
     }
@@ -349,15 +339,7 @@ async def sentiment_analyzer_handler(params: Dict[str, Any]) -> Any:
     text = params.get("text", "")
     normalized_text = text.lower()
     positive_terms = {"thank", "thanks", "great", "good", "excellent", "감사", "좋"}
-    negative_terms = {
-        "disappointed",
-        "urgent",
-        "issue",
-        "problem",
-        "bad",
-        "불만",
-        "문제",
-    }
+    negative_terms = {"disappointed", "urgent", "issue", "problem", "bad", "불만", "문제"}
     positive_hits = [term for term in positive_terms if term in normalized_text]
     negative_hits = [term for term in negative_terms if term in normalized_text]
     if negative_hits and len(negative_hits) >= len(positive_hits):
@@ -551,7 +533,6 @@ def _parameter_matches_type(value: Any, expected_type: str) -> bool:
     tone_analyzer_handler,
 )
 
-
 async def text_analyzer_handler(params: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, int]:
     text = params.get("text", "")
     char_count = len(text)
@@ -564,7 +545,6 @@ async def text_analyzer_handler(params: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, int]:
         "word_count": len(text.split()),
     }
 
-
 registry.register(
     ToolInfo(
         code="text_analyzer",
@@ -841,22 +821,6 @@ async def meeting_agenda_generator_handler(params: Dict[str, Any]) -> Any:
 )
 
 
-async def uuid_v4_generator_handler(params: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, str]:
-    return {"uuid": str(uuid.uuid4())}
-
-
-registry.register(
-    ToolInfo(
-        code="uuid_v4_generator",
-        name="UUID V4 생성기 (UUID v4 Generator)",
-        description="범용 고유 식별자(UUID) 버전 4를 무작위로 생성합니다.",
-        category="유틸리티",
-        parameters={},
-    ),
-    uuid_v4_generator_handler,
-)
-
-
 @router.get("/tools", response_model=list[ToolInfo])
 def get_tools() -> list[ToolInfo]:
     """

backend/scripts/disksage_copy_readiness_handoff.py

@@ -61,10 +61,6 @@
 READINESS_STATES = frozenset(
     {"no-candidates", "blocked", "partially-ready", "ready-without-new-review"}
 )
-# DiskSage schema v5 adds path-free provider-global-sync evidence while retaining the same
-# success contract consumed by this handoff. Keep v3/v4 readable for already-issued evidence
-# records; newer envelopes must be added here deliberately and tested.
-SUPPORTED_READINESS_SCHEMA_VERSIONS = frozenset({3, 4, 5})
 ERROR_CODE_PATTERN = re.compile(r"[a-z0-9]+(?:-[a-z0-9]+)*")
 
 
@@ -359,7 +355,7 @@ def _decode_protocol(result: VerifierResult) -> dict[str, object]:
             and payload.get("ok") is True
             and payload.get("schema_kind") == "disksage.naruon.cloud-copy-readiness"
             and type(payload.get("schema_version")) is int
-            and payload.get("schema_version") in SUPPORTED_READINESS_SCHEMA_VERSIONS
+            and payload.get("schema_version") == 3
             and payload.get("provider") in PROVIDERS
             and payload.get("readiness_state") in READINESS_STATES
             and type(payload.get("candidate_count")) is int

backend/services/email_client.py

@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ class ValidatedSmtpDestination:
     proto: int
     sockaddr: tuple[Any, ...]
 
+
 @dataclass(frozen=True)
 class EmailMessageParams:
     to_address: str
@@ -53,6 +54,7 @@ class EmailMessageParams:
     in_reply_to: str | None = None
     references: str | None = None
 
+
 @dataclass(frozen=True)
 class SmtpConfig:
     smtp_server: str
@@ -61,9 +63,10 @@ class SmtpConfig:
     smtp_password: str | None = None
 
 
-
 def generate_oauth2_string(user: str, access_token: str) -> bytes:
     """Generates an OAuth2 string for IMAP/SMTP authentication."""
+    if "\x01" in user or "\x01" in access_token:
+        raise ValueError("Invalid character in user or access token")
     auth_string = f"user={user}\x01auth=Bearer {access_token}\x01\x01"
     return base64.b64encode(auth_string.encode("utf-8"))
 
@@ -102,21 +105,15 @@ def _parse_allowed_ports(
 
 
 def _parse_allowed_smtp_ports() -> set[int]:
-    return _parse_allowed_ports(
-        settings.ALLOWED_SMTP_PORTS, "SMTP", SMTP_EGRESS_PORTS
-    )
+    return _parse_allowed_ports(settings.ALLOWED_SMTP_PORTS, "SMTP", SMTP_EGRESS_PORTS)
 
 
 def _parse_allowed_imap_ports() -> set[int]:
-    return _parse_allowed_ports(
-        settings.ALLOWED_IMAP_PORTS, "IMAP", IMAP_EGRESS_PORTS
-    )
+    return _parse_allowed_ports(settings.ALLOWED_IMAP_PORTS, "IMAP", IMAP_EGRESS_PORTS)
 
 
 def _parse_allowed_pop3_ports() -> set[int]:
-    return _parse_allowed_ports(
-        settings.ALLOWED_POP3_PORTS, "POP3", POP3_EGRESS_PORTS
-    )
+    return _parse_allowed_ports(settings.ALLOWED_POP3_PORTS, "POP3", POP3_EGRESS_PORTS)
 
 
 def _parse_allowed_smtp_hosts() -> set[str]:
@@ -561,7 +558,9 @@ def build_email_message(
     message["To"] = _validate_email_header_value(message_params.to_address)
     message["Subject"] = _validate_email_header_value(message_params.subject)
     if message_params.in_reply_to:
-        message["In-Reply-To"] = _validate_email_header_value(message_params.in_reply_to)
+        message["In-Reply-To"] = _validate_email_header_value(
+            message_params.in_reply_to
+        )
     if message_params.references:
         message["References"] = _validate_email_header_value(message_params.references)
     message.set_content(message_params.body)
@@ -591,7 +590,9 @@ async def send_email(
         )
         return {"status": "simulated", "simulated": True}
 
-    smtp_destination = validate_smtp_destination(smtp_config.smtp_server, smtp_config.smtp_port)
+    smtp_destination = validate_smtp_destination(
+        smtp_config.smtp_server, smtp_config.smtp_port
+    )
 
     try:
         smtp_socket = await _connect_validated_smtp_socket(smtp_destination)

backend/tests/test_disksage_copy_readiness_handoff.py

@@ -111,16 +111,6 @@ def test_main_delegates_to_absolute_verifier_without_shell_env_or_input_read(
     assert not (tmp_path / "must-not-exist").exists()
 
 
-@pytest.mark.parametrize("schema_version", [4, 5])
-def test_main_accepts_current_disksage_schema_versions(tmp_path, capsys, schema_version):
-    payload = _success_payload()
-    payload["schema_version"] = schema_version
-    verifier = _json_verifier(tmp_path / "verifier", payload, 0)
-
-    assert handoff.main(_handoff_args(verifier, tmp_path / "readiness.json")) == 0
-    assert json.loads(capsys.readouterr().out) == payload
-
-
 @pytest.mark.parametrize("exit_code", [64, 65])
 def test_main_preserves_valid_disksage_failure_protocol(tmp_path, capsys, exit_code):
     payload = {

backend/tests/test_email_client.py

@@ -18,6 +18,14 @@ def test_generate_oauth2_string():
     assert b"auth=Bearer dummy_token" in decoded
 
 
+def test_generate_oauth2_string_rejects_delimiter():
+    with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="Invalid character in user or access token"):
+        generate_oauth2_string("test@example.com\x01test=test", "dummy_token")
+
+    with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="Invalid character in user or access token"):
+        generate_oauth2_string("test@example.com", "dummy_token\x01\x01")
+
+
 def test_build_email_message_sets_reply_headers():
     params = EmailMessageParams(
         to_address="test@example.com",
@@ -66,7 +74,9 @@ def test_build_email_message_rejects_newlines_in_header_fields(
         kwargs[field_name] = field_value
 
     params = EmailMessageParams(**kwargs)
-    with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="Email header fields must not contain newlines"):
+    with pytest.raises(
+        ValueError, match="Email header fields must not contain newlines"
+    ):
         build_email_message(message_params=params, from_address=from_address)
 
 
@@ -83,7 +93,10 @@ async def test_send_email_logs_sanitized_recipient(caplog):
 
     assert result == {"status": "simulated", "simulated": True}
     messages = [record.getMessage() for record in caplog.records]
-    assert "Simulating sending email to victim@example.com (no SMTP server configured)" in messages
+    assert (
+        "Simulating sending email to victim@example.com (no SMTP server configured)"
+        in messages
+    )
     assert all("\n" not in message and "\r" not in message for message in messages)