fix(strix): resolve evidence binder from trusted source

CHANGELOG.d/20260920-strix-trusted-binder-runtime-fixture.md

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+### Strix keeps trusted evidence binding outside consumer workspaces
+
+- The Strix gate resolves its evidence binder beside the trusted gate source.
+  The executable core harness now materializes that trusted runtime under a
+  separate source directory, passes a binder-free consumer workspace through
+  `STRIX_REPO_ROOT`, and invokes the trusted gate by its absolute path.
+- OpenCode coverage assertions follow the consolidated
+  `validate-pr-metadata` owner instead of the removed
+  `coverage-source-tree` job and failure-report step.
+- The commercial-readiness receipt contract now compares the complete parsed
+  harden-runner endpoint set instead of treating an expected hostname as a URL
+  substring. This closes the exact CodeQL
+  `py/incomplete-url-substring-sanitization` finding without suppressing it or
+  widening egress.
+- The branch adopts the current central dependency owner, including the
+  explicit AnyIO 4.14.2 source-to-hash pin required by the Python security
+  gate.

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+### Strix supplies bounded Job Analysis authority context from the trusted base
+
+- ContextualWisdomLab/orgmetra#63 changes `packages/hris-kernel/src/orgmetra_hris_kernel/job_analysis.py`, but the Strix scan workspace previously omitted the unchanged authorization, HTTP, snapshot, and persistence collaborators that establish its resource-ownership boundary. That incomplete context produced a false HIGH IDOR finding even though the product reconstructs owner scope and authorizes resource fields before port access. A source-first executable fixture now requires the changed PR-head module, exactly five unchanged Job Analysis authority files from the authenticated trusted base, and exclusion of an unrelated administration file. RED `1fd22f4e` failed because `auth.py` was absent; the gate now recognizes only the normalized Job Analysis trigger and adds the five fixed context paths through the existing trusted-base materialization boundary. Follow-up `5ee6c876da508e45d284517a3812d52e053e3728` closes a fail-open edge in that contract: if any of the five required trusted-base files is absent while the Job Analysis trigger changed, the gate exits before invoking Strix. The same commit pins pytest-asyncio's fixture loop scope to `function`, eliminating the suite's configuration deprecation without changing any async fixture behavior. No consumer source, provider/model policy, severity gate, timeout, or write authority changes.
+
 ### OpenCode coverage image materializes every Dockerfile lock input
 
 - Required OpenCode run `35370902053` for `.github#2266@12621f75e` failed before executing PR code because its trusted Dockerfile copied `requirements-noema-document-ci-hashes.txt` while the isolated build context contained only the OpenCode lockfile. The coverage owner now validates both lockfiles as regular non-symlink files and copies both into the trusted build context before the networked image build. `tests/test_opencode_agent_contract.py` pins the complete input boundary. Hosted exact-head acceptance remains Proposed until the new run reaches the image-build and coverage steps.

docs/product-technical-gap-baseline.md

@@ -3430,3 +3430,87 @@ alone -- it is a documented multi-PR hot-file collision zone. Contract:
 **Action.** Exact `57477289ebec5631b0c48f0bc419f336dbe19deb` adds a dependency-free synthetic-302 transport to `tests/test_github_api_url_boundary.py`. For both actual production openers, the case drives a canonical bearer request through the real HTTPS open/response chain, requires the typed HTTP-302 failure mapping, and proves transport receives exactly one original request; lookalike HTTPS, HTTP, `file:`, and same-authority redirect targets never receive a second request or bearer. Exact `e0b0b4d4fff5b6ea88236a1e91dcd7dbb3be09b5` repairs the doctoring claim so direct-handler coverage is not mislabeled as production-chain proof.
 
 **Evidence / remaining condition.** The standalone fixture mechanism was executed locally against Python stdlib and produced one canonical request followed by terminal HTTP 302 for every hostile target. This is mechanism evidence, not repository acceptance. Final authority requires focused/full exact-tree GREEN, fresh exact-head Security/SAST/Python Security/CodeQL/runtime-quality checks, no unresolved actionable review, ordinary protected-main integration, and downstream consumer validation. No scanner suppression, redirect allowlist widening, provider fallback, workflow gate weakening, or credential-boundary change is included.
+
+## 2026-09-20 Strix trusted-binder consumer-isolation gap
+
+**Status:** Proposed on `ContextualWisdomLab/.github#2291`; exact-head hosted
+checks, independent review, and protected-main integration remain required.
+
+**Context Map / owner.** The central `.github` CI bounded context owns
+`strix_quick_gate.sh`, its evidence binder, and the executable gate harness.
+Consumer repositories supply only the scan workspace through
+`STRIX_REPO_ROOT`; they do not copy or own the binder.
+
+**Gap / root cause.** The production gate incorrectly resolved the trusted
+binder from the consumer root. The first repair correctly moved that lookup to
+`SCRIPT_DIR`, but its test harness copied only the gate and model helper into
+the isolated fixture. The current PR head therefore still reproduced the same
+missing-binder exit in the `success` scenario. Three assertions in that harness
+also described the removed standalone `coverage-source-tree` job after its
+responsibility moved into `validate-pr-metadata`.
+
+**Action / evidence.** The production gate resolves
+`strix_evidence_binding.py` beside its trusted source. RED `191bd630`
+requires the generic executable consumer fixture to contain no binder. GREEN
+`ef1a8667` materializes the gate, model helper, and binder under a separate
+`trusted-source/scripts/ci` directory, passes only the binder-free consumer
+workspace through `STRIX_REPO_ROOT`, and invokes the trusted gate by its
+absolute path. This makes the core executable fixture reproduce the production
+owner boundary instead of proving a co-located copy. The full exact-tree Strix
+harness and hosted checks remain the release authority; no provider, model,
+timeout, severity, or consumer ownership boundary changes.
+
+**2026-09-26 exact-head RCA / owner integration.** Exact Python-security job
+`107750961662` on head `1794626af3473ef23b9c2e678c3f06fd6c11636f`
+found AnyIO 4.14.0's CVE-2026-63374, CVE-2026-64847, and CVE-2026-63349 in
+`requirements-strix-ci-hashes.txt`; this branch had not adopted the central
+source-to-hash AnyIO 4.14.2 repair from `ContextualWisdomLab/.github#2385`.
+Exact CodeQL dispatch run `36204821293`, Python job `108319933572`, separately
+produced one Medium+ SARIF result:
+`py/incomplete-url-substring-sanitization` at
+`tests/test_organization_commercial_readiness_loop_receipt_contract.py:60`.
+The receipt test parsed the complete YAML endpoint block but then expressed the
+expected receiver hostname through a subset/membership-style assertion that
+CodeQL correctly rejects on URL-security surfaces. The ordinary two-parent
+owner integration adopts #2385's AnyIO contract; the test now compares the
+complete seven-entry endpoint set exactly. This strengthens the egress oracle:
+an unexpected endpoint fails rather than being tolerated. No CodeQL query,
+severity, SARIF gate, dependency audit, or endpoint allowlist is suppressed or
+widened. Fresh exact-head hosted Python Security and CodeQL remain mandatory.
+
+**2026-09-27 Job Analysis bounded-context repair.** ContextualWisdomLab/orgmetra#63 exact head
+`d88800a5ca3ca15df332e8def5e25064c46e4005` changes the HRIS-kernel Job
+Analysis aggregate module, while the trusted scan workspace previously omitted
+the unchanged product-owned authority context that explains its ownership
+checks. Strix consequently reported a HIGH IDOR finding against an incomplete
+workspace even though the Job Analysis API reconstructs the canonical owner and
+authorizes resource fields before snapshot or PostgreSQL port access. Source-
+first RED `1fd22f4e1e86d0ebfe5dab932697e95593c9ad10` adds an executable
+pull-request-target fixture whose fake scanner refuses to run unless the changed
+PR-head `job_analysis.py` is accompanied by exactly the five fixed trusted-base
+collaborators (`auth.py`, `authorization.py`, `http.py`, `postgres.py`, and
+`snapshot.py`); it also proves an unrelated administration module is excluded.
+The minimal GREEN recognizes only that normalized trigger and emits those five
+paths through the existing trusted-base context materializer. This is a bounded
+CI-context repair, not a transfer of product domain truth: no Orgmetra source,
+authorization order, persistence boundary, model/provider policy, severity,
+timeout, or write capability changes. Exact-head hosted Strix acceptance,
+independent review, ordinary protected-main integration, and a fresh
+ContextualWisdomLab/orgmetra#63 consumer run remain mandatory before the
+false-positive gap is complete.
+
+**2026-09-27 required-context fail-closed follow-up.** Review of PR #2291 at
+head `b90d873e67860944308d5cef919a1f95243ef98f` found that the five paths above
+were selected but not required: the shared trusted-context copier treated a
+missing base path as an optional success. A Job Analysis scan could therefore
+reach Strix without the authority evidence the mapping promises. RED removed
+`auth.py` from the authenticated base, changed only the Job Analysis kernel,
+and observed exit 1 after one fake-Strix invocation. Exact source commit
+`5ee6c876da508e45d284517a3812d52e053e3728` makes those five paths mandatory
+only when that kernel trigger is in the authenticated changed-file inventory;
+missing context now exits 2 before Strix, while unrelated mapping families keep
+their prior optional-file behavior. The full Strix shell harness passes, and
+the full Python suite passes with DeprecationWarning promoted to an error
+(`3388 passed, 28 skipped, 40 subtests`). Hosted exact-head checks, qualifying
+independent review, ordinary protected-main integration, and a fresh
+ContextualWisdomLab/orgmetra#63 consumer run remain mandatory.

pyproject.toml

@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ dev = [
 
 [tool.pytest.ini_options]
 pythonpath = ["."]
+asyncio_default_fixture_loop_scope = "function"
 
 [tool.coverage.run]
 branch = true

scripts/ci/strix_quick_gate.sh

@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ PY
 sanitize_remediation_evidence_claims() {
 	local log_file="$1"
 	local report_root="$2"
-	local binder="$REPO_ROOT/scripts/ci/strix_evidence_binding.py"
+	local binder="$SCRIPT_DIR/strix_evidence_binding.py"
 	local report_file
 
 	if [ ! -f "$binder" ] || [ -L "$binder" ]; then
@@ -1384,6 +1384,7 @@ pull_request_scope_context_files() {
 	local needs_backend_app_python=0
 	local needs_contextual_orchestrator_python=0
 	local needs_frontend_email_api_context=0
+	local needs_orgmetra_job_analysis_authority_context=0
 	local needs_deployment_context=0
 	local changed_file normalized_changed_file
 	for changed_file in "$@"; do
@@ -1400,6 +1401,9 @@ pull_request_scope_context_files() {
 		contextual_orchestrator/*.py)
 			needs_contextual_orchestrator_python=1
 			;;
+		packages/hris-kernel/src/orgmetra_hris_kernel/job_analysis.py)
+			needs_orgmetra_job_analysis_authority_context=1
+			;;
 		# The app shell, email components, threading URL builder, and API client can
 		# shape frontend email retrieval flows; include backend auth context with them.
 		frontend/src/components/EmailDetail.tsx | frontend/src/components/EmailList.tsx | frontend/src/app/page.tsx | frontend/src/lib/api-client.ts | frontend/src/lib/email-threading.ts)
@@ -1549,6 +1553,16 @@ backend/services/threading_service.py
 EOF
 	fi
 
+	if [ "$needs_orgmetra_job_analysis_authority_context" -eq 1 ]; then
+		cat <<'EOF'
+services/job-analysis-api/src/orgmetra_job_analysis_api/auth.py
+services/job-analysis-api/src/orgmetra_job_analysis_api/authorization.py
+services/job-analysis-api/src/orgmetra_job_analysis_api/http.py
+services/job-analysis-api/src/orgmetra_job_analysis_api/postgres.py
+services/job-analysis-api/src/orgmetra_job_analysis_api/snapshot.py
+EOF
+	fi
+
 	if [ "$needs_deployment_context" -eq 1 ]; then
 		cat <<'EOF'
 Dockerfile
@@ -1688,6 +1702,26 @@ PY
 		esac
 		local src_path="$REPO_ROOT/$relative_path"
 		if [ ! -e "$src_path" ]; then
+			case "$relative_path" in
+			services/job-analysis-api/src/orgmetra_job_analysis_api/auth.py | \
+				services/job-analysis-api/src/orgmetra_job_analysis_api/authorization.py | \
+				services/job-analysis-api/src/orgmetra_job_analysis_api/http.py | \
+				services/job-analysis-api/src/orgmetra_job_analysis_api/postgres.py | \
+				services/job-analysis-api/src/orgmetra_job_analysis_api/snapshot.py)
+				local job_analysis_change_rc=0
+				changed_file_list_contains \
+					"packages/hris-kernel/src/orgmetra_hris_kernel/job_analysis.py" || job_analysis_change_rc=$?
+				case "$job_analysis_change_rc" in
+				0)
+					echo "ERROR: required Job Analysis trusted context file is unavailable: $context_file" >&2
+					return 2
+					;;
+				2)
+					return 2
+					;;
+				esac
+				;;
+			esac
 			return 0
 		fi
 		if [ ! -f "$src_path" ] || [ -L "$src_path" ]; then