Decide WebSocket upgrades in the session, complete them in the host (COL-84) - #1745
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Port the production divergence in the session WebSocket manager onto the SocketHost port so the two repositories carry the same manager: - Accepting a sandbox socket closes every other live sandbox socket, not only the cached one. After hibernation the in-memory pointer is gone but the old bridge's socket is still attached under its tags, so a replacement bridge left the previous one open. - The cached sandbox socket is validated against the persisted sandbox ID before being returned, closing it with "Sandbox identity changed" when a respawn moved the row on. Hibernation recovery already did this; the cached fast path skipped it. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01E3k9fw7GE4HMYHh86vKxXp
…mplete them in the host (COL-84) The connection authenticator no longer performs the upgrade. It returns an UpgradeDecision: accept (sandbox with the presented id, or client with a fresh ws id) or reject with the response to send. Every guard keeps its place and order after token validation: 403 wrong sandbox id, 401 invalid token, 410 session terminal, 410 sandbox stopped, 403 credentials changed. The host completes the handshake because only it can produce a socket, then hands the server side back to `attach`, which adopts it through the manager and runs the connection's side effects. On Cloudflare that is `upgradeWebSocket` in src/cloudflare, called from the Durable Object's fetch; it owns the WebSocketPair and the 101. A Node host will call the same two methods around `ws.handleUpgrade`. The runtime exposes `upgrades` and `requestLogger` for that entry point; the HTTP dispatcher no longer sees upgrades, and the manager no longer creates socket pairs. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01E3k9fw7GE4HMYHh86vKxXp
Terraform Validation Results
Pushed by: @ColeMurray, Action: |
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No actionable comments were generated in the recent review. 🎉 ℹ️ Recent review info⚙️ Run configurationConfiguration used: defaults Review profile: CHILL Plan: Team Run ID: 📒 Files selected for processing (5)
Included review availability: Your plan provides up to 8 included reviews per hour; 6 remain after this review. 📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe change separates WebSocket authorization from handshake completion. The Cloudflare host now creates the ChangesWebSocket upgrade flow
Estimated code review effort: 4 (Complex) | ~45 minutes Merge Risk: ⚪ Minimal · up to WebSocket upgrade authorization and host-side handshake handling are refactored while preserving role guards and attachment lifecycle behavior. No current merge-blocking risk remains. Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant SessionDO
participant upgradeWebSocket
participant SessionConnectionAuthenticator
participant WebSocketPair
SessionDO->>upgradeWebSocket: pass upgrade request and runtime.upgrades
upgradeWebSocket->>SessionConnectionAuthenticator: authorize(request)
SessionConnectionAuthenticator-->>upgradeWebSocket: accept or reject decision
upgradeWebSocket->>WebSocketPair: create client and server sockets
upgradeWebSocket->>SessionConnectionAuthenticator: decision.attach(server)
upgradeWebSocket-->>SessionDO: return 101 response with client socket
🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4 | ❌ 1❌ Failed checks (1 warning)
✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
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Inline comments:
In `@packages/control-plane/src/cloudflare/websocket-upgrade.ts`:
- Around line 21-26: Update the catch block handling upgradeWebSocket failures
to close the server socket before returning the 500 response, ensuring the
cached socket is no longer available through getSandboxSocket when attach()
fails during lifecycleManager scheduling.
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📒 Files selected for processing (10)
packages/control-plane/src/cloudflare/websocket-upgrade.tspackages/control-plane/src/session/components.tspackages/control-plane/src/session/connection-authenticator.test.tspackages/control-plane/src/session/connection-authenticator.tspackages/control-plane/src/session/durable-object.tspackages/control-plane/src/session/http/dispatcher.tspackages/control-plane/src/session/request-logger.tspackages/control-plane/src/session/server.test.tspackages/control-plane/src/session/websocket-manager.test.tspackages/control-plane/src/session/websocket-manager.ts
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- packages/control-plane/src/session/server.test.ts
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Summary
PR #1745, Decide WebSocket upgrades in the session, complete them in the host (COL-84) by @ColeMurray, changes 10 files (+623/-188). The refactor cleanly separates admission from host-specific WebSocket construction while preserving sandbox authentication guard order and connection side effects; I found no blocking correctness, security, performance, or maintainability issues.
Critical Issues
None.
Suggestions
None.
Nitpicks
None.
Positive Feedback
- The narrow
SessionUpgradeAdmissioninterface keeps Workers-only APIs confined to the Cloudflare adapter. - The post-hash state and credential checks preserve the existing race protections.
- Coverage is strong across authorization decisions, attachment side effects, hibernated socket replacement, and cached sandbox identity validation.
Questions
None.
Verification
Targeted connection-authenticator and WebSocket-manager tests pass (81 tests), the control-plane typecheck passes, and all completed GitHub CI checks are passing.
Verdict
Approve: ready to merge.
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The transport split is directionally right and the guard ordering is preserved, but the new boundary is not yet safe or structurally complete. Attachment can partially commit and then return HTTP 500, the two-call API makes the authorization-to-attachment invariant a convention, and closing replaced sandbox sockets does not revoke their authority to deliver queued events. These are boundary/design issues that should be resolved before this becomes the contract used by the Node host.
No changed file crosses 1,000 lines (components.ts grows from 973 to 977). Verification: targeted connection-authenticator, WebSocket-manager, and server tests pass (102 tests), and the control-plane typecheck passes after building @open-inspect/shared.
| const pair = new WebSocketPair(); | ||
| const [client, server] = Object.values(pair); | ||
| try { | ||
| await upgrades.attach(server, decision, log); |
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[deep review] This boundary can partially commit an upgrade and then report failure. Sandbox attach accepts/caches the new socket, closes the previous bridge, marks the sandbox ready, and broadcasts that state before its final fallible scheduleInactivityCheck() await. If that await rejects, this adapter returns 500 without closing either endpoint or undoing the published state, so the caller never receives a 101 while an orphan server socket may remain authoritative. This is exactly where the new host/session split should define atomic ownership, not inherit the old incidental try/catch. Please structure attachment as prepare-then-commit, or give it explicit rollback/close semantics and test the failure path so a failed handshake cannot replace a healthy bridge or publish readiness.
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Agreed, and restructured in 2f1bc66 as prepare-then-commit. In attachSandbox the only await (scheduleInactivityCheck) now runs before anything is published; adopting the socket, closing the previous bridge, the ready status, and both broadcasts are synchronous after it. A failed handshake leaves the previous bridge in place and publishes nothing. The adapter closes the server half on failure as a belt-and-braces measure. Tests: arms the inactivity check before adopting the socket pins the ordering, and commits nothing when the inactivity check cannot be armed asserts no accept, no status write, no broadcast, no queued task.
| */ | ||
| export interface SessionUpgradeAdmission { | ||
| authorize(request: Request, log: Logger): Promise<UpgradeDecision>; | ||
| attach(ws: WebSocket, accepted: AcceptedUpgrade, log: Logger): Promise<void>; |
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[deep review] The central security/lifecycle invariant is only documented, not represented by the API: any caller can fabricate or reuse an AcceptedUpgrade, call attach without authorize, and supply a different logger. The new tests do exactly that with hand-built decisions, which means they cannot prove the intended sequencing. There is a code-judo move here: have authorize(request) create the request log and return either the rejection or a one-shot attachment capability that closes over the accepted identity and log. That deletes exported AcceptedUpgrade, removes the extra requestLogger runtime surface and repeated logger plumbing, and makes the only successful path structurally be authorize -> host handshake -> attach.
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Took the code-judo move as described, in 2f1bc66. authorize(request) builds the request-scoped logger itself and returns either the rejection or an accepted decision carrying a one-shot attach(ws) closed over the admitted identity and that logger. AcceptedUpgrade and the runtime's requestLogger surface are deleted, and the adapter passes no logger into the session. The tests now go through authorize for every attachment (including the sandbox ones, which authenticate a real token hash), and attaches exactly once proves a second attach throws.
| this.sandboxWs.close(1000, "New sandbox connecting"); | ||
| replaced = true; | ||
| } | ||
| existing.close(1000, "New sandbox connecting"); |
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[deep review] Calling close() is cleanup, not an authorization fence. Every replaced socket keeps its sandbox tags, while SessionMessageRouter.route treats any tagged sandbox socket as authoritative and never checks it against the manager's active socket. An already-queued frame from one of these hibernated/replaced bridges can therefore still mutate session state after the new bridge is selected; a swallowed close failure makes that window unbounded. Please make active sandbox identity/generation explicit and invalidate the old generation synchronously before publishing the replacement, then require that active identity at sandbox message dispatch. The current scan moves more sockets toward closed but does not establish the singleton authority its method contract claims.
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Agreed that close() is cleanup, not a fence, and that the router accepts frames from any sandbox-tagged socket without checking it against the active one. That gap predates this PR: the router has never made that check, and this hunk is the manager production has run since #1586, reconciled here so the port lands identically in both repositories. Making the active identity explicit and requiring it at dispatch is a behavior change of its own (a stale bridge's trailing execution_complete during a reconnect is processed today; hibernation recovery picks the first matching socket), so I have filed it as COL-128 (P-9, blocking N-8) with the generation-then-dispatch-check design you outlined rather than folding it into the transport split. Happy to pull it forward if you would rather it land first.
…ility that commits atomically Review round on #1745. `authorize(request)` now returns either the rejection or an accepted decision carrying `attach(ws)`, a one-shot closure over the admitted identity and the request-scoped logger. There is no other way to attach, so authorize → host handshake → attach is the only successful path by construction. The exported AcceptedUpgrade type and the runtime's requestLogger surface go away with it. Sandbox attachment is prepare-then-commit: arming the inactivity alarm is the one fallible await and runs first; adopting the socket, marking the sandbox ready, and the broadcasts follow synchronously, so a failed handshake leaves the previous bridge in place and publishes nothing. The Cloudflare adapter closes the server half on failure. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01E3k9fw7GE4HMYHh86vKxXp
Terraform Validation Results
Pushed by: @ColeMurray, Action: |
… Durable Object storage (COL-87) (#1746) ## Summary Roadmap **P-8 / COL-87** (Control plane on AWS, epic E1, milestone M0). No dependencies; unblocks N-1 (the Node per-session store) and V-1 (the conformance CI lane). The session-core conformance suite existed only in the production repository. All roadmap work is public-first and the Node host must run this exact suite, so it moves here and runs on both storages from one file. ### What changed - **`test/conformance/session-core-conformance.ts`** (ported, then restructured): the eight repository suites are an id-keyed registry (`STORAGE_CONTRACTS`), the four host contracts own their titles (`HOST_CONTRACTS`), and the manifest is derived from both. A host declares each host contract in its own integration suite with `hostContract(id, …)`, which has no skipped form; `manifest.test.ts` scans the integration suites for those declarations, so a host that forgets a contract fails there. - **Two registrations, one suite.** `test/conformance/session-core-conformance.node.test.ts` runs it on an in-memory `node:sqlite` database inside `npm test`; `test/integration/session-core-conformance.test.ts` (ported) runs it on Durable Object storage inside `npm run test:integration`. - **`test/conformance/node-sqlite-storage.ts`**: the `node:sqlite` helper that `schema.test.ts` and `alarm/scheduler.test.ts` each duplicated, consolidated as one test helper `createNodeSqlStorage(db): { sql, transactionSync }` and used by both tests and the Node conformance run. It interprets no SQL text: one statement versus a script comes from the prepared statement's extent, rows from stepping it, and `rowsWritten` from SQLite's change counter, so comments, CTE writes, `RETURNING`, semicolons in literals, and scripts behave as on Durable Object storage (`node-sqlite-storage.test.ts` pins each). `transactionSync` nests as savepoints. It stays a test file; whether the Node host's store builds on it is N-1's call, and nothing in `src/` imports it. - **Typecheck.** `tsconfig.test.json` (the Node-typed program) now also covers `test/conformance/**`. The production and workerd programs are unchanged. - **Socket contract tests** production has carried in `websocket-sandbox.test.ts` come across: 410 for a `stale` sandbox (alongside `stopped`), exactly one live sandbox socket after replacement, and an ack on a re-flushed completion without duplicated durable effects. The single-sandbox contract replaces a socket accepted at the platform level that the manager's pointer has never seen (the post-hibernation shape); a pointer-only close leaves two live sockets and fails it, which is the manager hunk #1745 reconciled. ### Done when - [x] `npm test -w @open-inspect/control-plane` runs the 8 repository suites on `node:sqlite`; `npm run test:integration` runs them on Durable Object storage, from the same suite file. - [x] The manifest's four host contracts are declared by id in the integration tests that implement them, and a test enforces that every id is declared. - [ ] Prod and public `test/conformance/**` byte-identical: after this merges, the next public → prod sync takes these files wholesale (the manifest mapping and import order differ from prod's copy today). ### Verification - `npm run typecheck -w @open-inspect/control-plane`: clean (all three programs) - Unit: 248 files, 3,645 tests pass (conformance suite 12 on `node:sqlite`, adapter boundary 9, manifest 5) - Workerd integration: full suite green, including the ported socket-contract tests and the Durable Object conformance registration Closes COL-87. https://claude.ai/code/session_01E3k9fw7GE4HMYHh86vKxXp <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit - **Tests** - Expanded session, schema, storage, transaction, WebSocket, and prompt-processing test coverage. - Added cross-environment conformance checks to verify consistent behavior across supported storage and hosting implementations. - Added validation for duplicate message delivery, stale connections, sandbox replacement, and transaction rollback scenarios. - Improved automated checks to ensure all required contracts and integration tests are registered and executed. <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai -->
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Summary
Roadmap P-2 / COL-84 (Control plane on AWS, epic E1). Follows #1715 (P-1).
SessionConnectionAuthenticator.handleWebSocketUpgradeperformed the whole upgrade for both legs: it created aWebSocketPair, accepted the server half, and returned the 101 withwebSocket: client. Both the pair andResponse.webSocketexist only on Workers; on Node the HTTP server completes the handshake (ws.handleUpgrade) after the same authentication and guards. So the session now decides and the host accepts.What changed
UpgradeDecision(session/connection-authenticator.ts):authorize(request)runs every guard and returns either{ kind: "reject", response }or{ kind: "accept", role, attach(ws) }. Guard order is unchanged and still entirely after token validation: 403 wrong sandbox id → 401 invalid token → 410 session terminal → 410 sandbox stopped → 403 credentials changed.attachis a one-shot capability closed over the admitted identity and the request-scoped logger, so authorize → host handshake → attach is the only successful path by construction. Sandbox attachment is prepare-then-commit: arming the inactivity alarm is the one fallible await and runs first; adopting the socket, the ready status, and the broadcasts follow synchronously, so a failed handshake leaves the previous bridge in place and publishes nothing. The authenticator implements the narrowSessionUpgradeAdmissioninterface hosts program against.src/cloudflare/websocket-upgrade.ts: authorize →WebSocketPair→ attach the server half → 101 with the client half; on attach failure it closes the server half and returns 500.SessionDO.fetchroutesUpgrade: websocketrequests to it; everything else still goes throughserver.onRequest.createUpgradeSockets()is gone from the manager.SessionRuntimegainsupgrades; the request-correlation child logger moved tosession/request-logger.ts, shared by the dispatcher and the authenticator.SocketHostport. Accepting a bridge now closes every other live sandbox socket (not only the cached pointer, which hibernation drops), and the cached socket is validated against the persisted sandbox id before the fast-path return. Two tests ported with them.Deviations from the issue text
sandboxId/wsId); the identity is closed over.ClientInfois built atsubscribe, not at upgrade, so there was nothing else to carry.sockets.accept(server, tags)stays inside the manager (acceptClientSocket/acceptAndSetSandboxSocket) rather than moving to the adapter: the tags are manager-owned identity and the manager already reaches the host through theSocketHostport, so a Node host gets the same tagging for free.Done when
WebSocketPairorwebSocket:outsidesrc/cloudflare/(index.ts:141is the Worker-level forward, untouched per the issue).websocket-sandbox.test.ts,websocket-client.test.ts, the fix(control-plane): reject sandbox WS reconnect for terminal sessions #1577 410 race tests and the credentials-changed 403 test pass unchanged.connection-authenticator.test.tsdrivesauthorizewith fake collaborators and asserts the decision for each guard, including the mid-hash mutations, andattachfor both roles, the prepare-then-commit ordering, the nothing-committed failure path, and one-shot attachment.index.ts handleWebSocketuntouched.Verification
npm run typecheck -w @open-inspect/control-plane: cleanFollow-up filed, not in this PR
The deep review noted that closing replaced sandbox sockets is cleanup, not a dispatch fence: the message router processes frames from any
sandbox-tagged socket without checking it against the active one. That predates this PR (and the prod hunk it reconciles) and needs its own design for stale-bridge trailing events and hibernation recovery, so it is filed as COL-128 (P-9), blocking N-8.Closes COL-84. PR #1513 closed as superseded.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01E3k9fw7GE4HMYHh86vKxXp
Summary by CodeRabbit
New Features
Bug Fixes
Tests