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[Aikido] Pin zen-internals library digests to prevent supply-chain attacks in build workflow - #510
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…hashes in build workflow
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This patch mitigates supply-chain attacks on zen-internals native libraries by replacing dynamic digest fetching from upstream GitHub releases with firewall-controlled hardcoded SHA256 digests. The digests are now pinned in the build workflow and must be explicitly updated when upgrading the zen-internals version, ensuring that any unauthorized modifications to upstream libraries are detected. Changes were made to
.github/workflows/build.ymlto include documented SHA256 hashes with clear instructions for updating them during version upgrades.✅ 1 issue fixed by this PR
build.ymlfixes the dependency only to the release version0.1.64, downloads the architecture-specific shared object from the Zen Internals release, and obtains the expected SHA-256 from that release's GitHub API metadata. No firewall-controlled digest, independently trusted signature, or provenance identity is checked. An attacker able to alter the upstream release can make the locally calculated digest equal the fetched value, after which the object is moved into the RPM/DEB or Alpine package. The request processor later loads the packaged object withdlopen, so a successfully distributed poisoned package provides native code execution in the PHP firewall process.