A Product Definition Reference for BountyStrike v5. Consolidates the vision, success criteria, scope, and constraints that govern every build decision. Use this as the single-page anchor before reading anything else under docs/.
Status (2026-05-01): Phase 1 signed off (4/6 PASS, 2 GAP-deploy). Phase 2 §10.4 dedup recall fixture (recall=1.0) shipped same day. Phase 2 W7-8 sprint closed: scanner + exploit phases wired into orchestrator, T2/T3 approval queue + CLI shipped, T3 plumbing wired (commit 7001be1), and 5 new field-validation suites passed at TPR=1.0 / FPR=0.0 — SSRF→IMDS (e9b4b77), IDOR (65fe921), RCE (5493eea), SSTI (6ef4858), Open Redirect (1b6eb64). Phase 2 W9-10 (dedup-prod, kill-switch <5s SLA, SQLi field-validation suite) is the next gate. See phase1_signoff.md.
Operate a swarm of Claude-driven agents that find, verify, and submit real bug bounty reports — autonomously, within scope, under cost ceilings — and continuously beat human-only solo hunters on confirmed-rate × payout while staying below 5% false-positive submissions.
These are hard constraints. Any code, agent, or workflow that violates them is wrong by definition. Drawn verbatim from research/01-strategy-architecture.md §Vision.
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Scope enforcement at the network layer. A scope-JWT (RS256, 4096-bit) is issued by the control plane and validated by every MCP and sandbox before any outbound packet. Targets that fail the in-scope check are dropped at the iptables egress allowlist inside the Firecracker VM, not just at application logic. The JWT carries
wildcards,exact_hosts,ips,exclusions.hostnames,exclusions.paths,rate_limits.default_rps, and per-host overrides. Seescope-mcpandcontrol-plane/src/control_plane/domains/scope_management/services/jwt_issuer.py. -
Verification independent of exploitation. The validator never shares context, model, or sandbox with the exploiter. Each finding goes through a deterministic oracle in
mcp/oracle-mcp— XSS via Playwright DOM mutation observer, SSRF via OAST callback, SQLi via Welch's t-test on response timing, etc. — running in a fresh microVM. This is the moat against AnyPoC reward-hacking. Phase 1 closed XSS and SSRF at TPR=1.0, FPR=0.0. -
Hash-chained, content-addressable evidence. Every finding has request/response transcripts, oracle data, and reproduction commands stored under SHA-256 content hashes with a
prev_audit_hashchain. Daily root hashes can optionally be anchored to Sigstore Rekor. Seeevidence_artifactstable andmcp/evidence-mcp. -
T1 / T2 / T3 human-tier approval gates. No report leaves the system without crossing the right tier. T0 = auto-confirm low-impact dupes; T1 = LLM-review (Sonnet); T2 = single human approver for medium-impact; T3 = two-person sign-off for high-impact / novel classes. Implemented in
control-plane/src/control_plane/domains/approval_gate/services.py; enforced by thepretool_approval_gate.pyhook. -
Per-program EV ranking, not "scan the world". A single ranked queue:
EV = f(payout, saturation, ops_load, fit, cve_signal). The agent works the top of the list and stops when the per-task or per-scan budget is hit. Seemcp/ev-mcp+control-plane/src/control_plane/domains/program_ranking/services/scoring_service.py. Thekev_match_programtool inmcp/kev-mcpfeeds CISA-KEV signals into thecve_signalweight.
| Metric | Target | Current state | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Confirmed-rate (submitted → confirmed) | ≥70% | TBD (Phase 4 measurement) | research/03-verifier-antislop.md §SLOs |
| False-positive submission rate | <5% | TBD | same |
| Time-to-validate (hypothesis → validated) | <30 min | TBD | same |
| Time-to-submit (validated → submitted) | <4 h | TBD | same |
| Cost per confirmed bug | <$5 USD | TBD | research/02-routing-ev.md §Cost Guardrails |
| Scope-violation incidents | 0 | 0 enforced (network layer) | non-negotiable #1 |
| Oracle accuracy (TPR/FPR) | ≥90% | XSS=1.0/0.0, SSRF=1.0/0.0, SSRF→IMDS=1.0/0.0, IDOR=1.0/0.0, RCE=1.0/0.0, SSTI=1.0/0.0, Open Redirect=1.0/0.0 (7 of 8 oracles validated; SQLi field-validation suite pending Phase 2 W9-10) | phase1_signoff.md Rounds 4 + 6 |
| Dedup recall | >95% | 100% (Phase 2 §10.4 fixture, commit 3d9e915) | phase1_signoff.md |
| Service uptime | >99.5% | TBD (Phase 4) | — |
| Operator NPS | >50 | TBD (Phase 4 alpha) | — |
- Active scanning of subdomains, endpoints, parameters, and form fields for the 8 oracle bug classes within JWT-validated scope.
- Submission to HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack, Immunefi via dedicated MCP submitters. Intigriti currently read-only via the researcher API; submission is a placeholder pending a relay endpoint (per
research/00c-context7-verifications.md). - Cost discipline via the model-routing matrix (16 task types × 4 cost tiers) in
research/02-routing-ev.md. Bulk triage on DeepSeek ($0.14/M input, cache-hit $0.0028/M) (per api-docs.deepseek.com; see docs/bountystrike_v6_phase0-1_technical_brief.md — corrects the v6 figure); deep reasoning on Opus ($5/M); Tier-S models for security-specific tasks (Pentest-R1, WhiteRabbitNeo). - Solo and SaaS deployment modes. Solo: single docker-compose stack, BYOK, <$30/mo. SaaS: per-tenant Firecracker isolation, signed scope JWTs, Temporal Cloud, LiteLLM proxy.
- DoS, brute force, mass exploitation, anything destructive — explicitly denied by
pretool_antislop.pyand the destructive-payload denylist incontrol-plane/src/control_plane/core/security/validation.py. - Out-of-band attacks beyond OAST callbacks (e.g., DNS poisoning, BGP manipulation).
- Targeting non-bounty assets — the JWT enforces this; agents physically cannot reach them.
- Detection-evasion techniques for malicious purposes. The platform exists to operate inside authorized programs, full stop.
The verifier is not "another LLM that says yes". It's a Playwright assertion, a Welch t-test, a regex on a callback hostname. The LLM hypothesis-generates; the oracle decides. AnyPoC reward-hacking modes (self-exploit via loopback, mock validation, hallucinated paths, timing artifacts) each have a specific countermeasure documented in research/03-verifier-antislop.md §AnyPoC matrix.
The agent CLAUDE.md says "stay in scope" — but the iptables rules inside the VM are what actually enforce it. Prompt injection that talks the agent into pivoting cannot beat the netfilter table. The scope-MCP validates the JWT and emits the firewall rules; the scope-guard sub-agent provides a synchronous policy adjudicator for ambiguous cases.
Per research/01-strategy-architecture.md §Storage: one Postgres 17 with pgvector + pg_trgm + (later) pgvectorscale handles everything up to ~500k findings. No Redis as a primary store, no Elasticsearch, no Kafka. Redis is just the kill-switch flag and approval-gate cache. The audit log is hash-chained inside Postgres; daily root anchored to Rekor only when SaaS multi-tenant lands.
Claude Code's PreToolUse / PostToolUse / SubagentStart lifecycle is where security policy lives. Four hooks ship today (kill switch, antislop, openrouter routing, approval gate). The 26-event hook stack documented in research/04-skills-mcps.md is the path to richer enforcement (cost ceilings, per-task budgets, scope re-validation on every tool call).
The agent's job is not "find the bug". It's to produce a hash-chained, reproducible artifact that a human triager can replay against the live system. Every finding ships with: request transcript, response transcript, oracle data, reproduction command, scope JWT JTI, sandbox VM ID. See evidence_artifacts.
Full register in research/06-roadmap.md §Risks (17 entries). Top:
| ID | Severity | Risk | Mitigation owner |
|---|---|---|---|
| R01 | CRITICAL | AI-slop reports erode platform trust | Validator sub-agent + 7-criteria report quality gate (research/03) |
| R02 | CRITICAL | Prompt injection breaks scope | Network-layer egress allowlist (non-negotiable #1) + scope-guard adjudicator |
| R03 | HIGH | CFAA / authorized-testing liability | JWT-bound scope is the legal artifact; never ingest a program without verified authorization |
| R08 | MED | EU CRA 24h disclosure deadline (effective 2026-09-11) | Phase 3 compliance hooks: 24h ack / 72h preliminary / 14d update timers |
| Phase | Window | State |
|---|---|---|
| 0 | Weeks 1-2 | DONE — repo scaffold, scope-MCP TypeScript, EV MVP, schema |
| 1 | Weeks 3-6 | DONE (2026-05-01 signoff): 4/6 PASS, 2 GAP-deploy (recon container image, R2 credentials) |
| 2 | Weeks 7-10 | IN PROGRESS — W7-8 closed: dedup recall=1.0 (3d9e915), scanner+exploit wired into orchestrator, T2/T3 approval queue shipped, T3 plumbing wired (7001be1), 5 field-validation suites at TPR=1.0/FPR=0.0 (SSRF→IMDS, IDOR, RCE, SSTI, Open Redirect). W9-10 open: dedup-prod, kill-switch <5s SLA, SQLi field-validation, schema-vs-spec contract test |
| 3 | Weeks 11-15 | NOT STARTED — solo-mode polish, alpha hunter onboarding |
| 4 | Weeks 16-20 | NOT STARTED — SaaS multi-tenant, Temporal Cloud, compliance hooks |
Latest git: e9b4b77 (today) — SSRF→IMDS field-validation suite at TPR=1.0/FPR=0.0. Earlier today: b7ec4e3 added kev_match_program for CISA-KEV ↔ tech-stack cross-reference (feeds Phase 2 EV-signal calibration); then 5 oracle field-validation suites + T3 orchestrator plumbing landed in rapid succession.
When a tradeoff appears, default to:
- Determinism > coverage. A verifier that misses a class is fine; a verifier that confirms a non-bug is not.
- Network enforcement > prompt enforcement. Always.
- One Postgres > many specialized stores. Until measured otherwise.
- Open-source / MCP-adopted > in-house. Don't rebuild what Burp/Caido/HexStrike/Garak already do well.
- BYOK + per-task ceiling > flat-rate spending. Cost discipline is a feature.
- Hand-curated docs > regenerated boilerplate. This file is hand-edited; let it stay that way.
codebase-summary.md— file map, dependencies, MCP inventorysystem-architecture.md— Mermaid diagrams of component graph, data flow, ER, trust boundariescode-standards.md— DDD layout, ruff rules, MCP template, hook authoringarchitecture/bountystrike_v5_build_plan.md— the full 20-week spec (4,525 LOC)research/06-roadmap.md— phase exit criteria + risk register + glossary