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SECURITY.md

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Security Policy

Supported versions

Version Supported
main (apps, engine image) ✅

There is no app release yet: fixes land on main, and the engine image is published from it. Streamline Player is maintained by one person.

Reporting a vulnerability

Do not open a public issue.

Use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting: Report a vulnerability. If that is unavailable to you, email dev@antoine-langlois.net instead.

Please include:

  • The commit or engine image tag, and which app (Android TV, desktop, web)
  • What an attacker can do: steal a device key, read a file outside the library through the engine, start a transcode without a playback token, etc.
  • Steps to reproduce (tokens and secrets redacted)

Expect an acknowledgement within a week and a fix or a decision within 30 days for anything exploitable. This is a spare-time project, not a vendor with an on-call rotation: if something is actively being exploited, say so up front and I will prioritise it. I will credit you in the advisory unless you'd rather stay anonymous.

Please give me a chance to ship a fix before disclosing publicly. There is no bug bounty.

Scope

In scope:

  • The apps: a device key or access token stored outside OS secure storage, reaching JavaScript, or leaking into a log; the webview loading or running content it should not (CSP, deep links, the sign-in redirect); a password passing through the app
  • The engine: serving or reading a file outside its media mounts; answering /hls or a download without a valid playback token, or for another session; a control-plane call (/v1) accepted without Streamline's secret; anything a request can slip into an ffmpeg command line
  • Supply-chain issues in the engine image build

Out of scope:

  • Vulnerabilities in the player extension (the API the apps call, sign-in, pairing, playback tokens): report those to streamline-player-ext, and those in Streamline itself to Streamline.
  • The engine's control plane reachable from untrusted networks. Only its data routes are meant to be published; /v1 belongs to Streamline.
  • Anything over plain HTTP. Streamline and the engine are built to sit behind TLS.
  • Vulnerabilities in ffmpeg, mpv, ExoPlayer, Shaka Player, WebKitGTK or the OS webviews themselves. Report those upstream.
  • Scanner or agent output with no demonstrated path to exploitation.