diff --git a/src/lib/LibMigrationInvariant.sol b/src/lib/LibMigrationInvariant.sol
index 554827d2..8d696a4a 100644
--- a/src/lib/LibMigrationInvariant.sol
+++ b/src/lib/LibMigrationInvariant.sol
@@ -73,6 +73,15 @@ library LibMigrationInvariant {
 
     /// @notice `address` overload. Casts each address to `bytes32` under the
     /// hood via `uint160`.
+    ///
+    /// The zero address is rejected as `actual` UNCONDITIONALLY — on either
+    /// side of the deadline, even when a migration side equals zero. Every
+    /// address-valued surface this lib asserts (owners, role holders) has
+    /// zero as its default/renounced/unset value, making it the single most
+    /// likely drift reading — so it is its own checked case, never an
+    /// accepted side. In particular an unhydrated `post` pin of zero means
+    /// "post-state unreachable", and a renounced-to-zero owner must trip
+    /// drift rather than read as "already migrated".
     /// @param label Human-readable identifier for the invariant surfaced in
     /// revert data.
     /// @param actual The value read from the live chain.
@@ -83,6 +92,11 @@ library LibMigrationInvariant {
         internal
         view
     {
+        if (actual == address(0)) {
+            revert MigrationStateDrift(
+                label, bytes32(uint256(uint160(pre))), bytes32(uint256(uint160(post))), bytes32(0)
+            );
+        }
         assertMigration(
             label,
             bytes32(uint256(uint160(actual))),
diff --git a/src/lib/LibTimelockInvariants.sol b/src/lib/LibTimelockInvariants.sol
index 7ad78622..edd442a2 100644
--- a/src/lib/LibTimelockInvariants.sol
+++ b/src/lib/LibTimelockInvariants.sol
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ library LibTimelockInvariants {
 
     /// @notice The ST0x governance timelock on **Base**. Equals
     /// `expectedTimelockAddress(STOX_TOKEN_OWNER_SAFE)`, which
-    /// `testPinsMatchDerivedAddressesOnceHydrated` asserts.
+    /// `testPinsMatchDerivedAddresses` asserts.
     /// https://basescan.org/address/0xdb4b2187a685310e6b64170c97b80e90dd4a9b71
     address internal constant STOX_GOVERNANCE_TIMELOCK = address(0xdb4b2187A685310E6b64170c97B80E90DD4a9B71);
 
diff --git a/test/src/lib/LibMigrationInvariant.t.sol b/test/src/lib/LibMigrationInvariant.t.sol
index 4b5d8a51..fe538b27 100644
--- a/test/src/lib/LibMigrationInvariant.t.sol
+++ b/test/src/lib/LibMigrationInvariant.t.sol
@@ -164,4 +164,49 @@ contract LibMigrationInvariantTest is Test {
         );
         harness.callAssertMigrationUint256(LABEL, 1, 1, 3, DEADLINE);
     }
+
+    /// @notice The zero address is rejected as `actual` on BOTH sides of
+    /// the deadline, even when a migration side equals zero. Zero is
+    /// Solidity's default-everything value — renounced ownership, unset
+    /// storage, a failed lookup — the single most likely drift reading, so
+    /// it is its own checked case, never an accepted side. The load-bearing
+    /// branch is the third: with an UNHYDRATED `post` pin of zero, a
+    /// renounced-to-zero owner must trip drift rather than read as
+    /// "already migrated".
+    function testAddressZeroActualAlwaysRejected() external {
+        address pre = address(0xAAAA);
+        address post = address(0xBBBB);
+
+        vm.warp(DEADLINE - 1);
+        vm.expectRevert(
+            abi.encodeWithSelector(
+                MigrationStateDrift.selector,
+                LABEL,
+                bytes32(uint256(uint160(pre))),
+                bytes32(uint256(uint160(post))),
+                bytes32(0)
+            )
+        );
+        harness.callAssertMigrationAddress(LABEL, address(0), pre, post, DEADLINE);
+
+        vm.warp(DEADLINE);
+        vm.expectRevert(
+            abi.encodeWithSelector(
+                MigrationStateDrift.selector,
+                LABEL,
+                bytes32(uint256(uint160(pre))),
+                bytes32(uint256(uint160(post))),
+                bytes32(0)
+            )
+        );
+        harness.callAssertMigrationAddress(LABEL, address(0), pre, post, DEADLINE);
+
+        vm.warp(DEADLINE - 1);
+        vm.expectRevert(
+            abi.encodeWithSelector(
+                MigrationStateDrift.selector, LABEL, bytes32(uint256(uint160(pre))), bytes32(0), bytes32(0)
+            )
+        );
+        harness.callAssertMigrationAddress(LABEL, address(0), pre, address(0), DEADLINE);
+    }
 }
diff --git a/test/src/lib/LibTimelockInvariants.t.sol b/test/src/lib/LibTimelockInvariants.t.sol
index 2fc20562..3697e366 100644
--- a/test/src/lib/LibTimelockInvariants.t.sol
+++ b/test/src/lib/LibTimelockInvariants.t.sol
@@ -240,30 +240,27 @@ contract LibTimelockInvariantsTest is Test {
         harness.callTimelockForChainId(31337);
     }
 
-    /// @notice The hydration contract for the per-chain pins: while a pin is
-    /// a placeholder it must be zero; once hydrated it must equal the
-    /// derived Zoltu address for that chain's Safe. Both directions are
-    /// asserted here so the post-deploy pin PR turns this from the
-    /// placeholder branch to the equality branch with no test change.
-    function testPinsMatchDerivedAddressesOnceHydrated() external pure {
-        address basePin = LibTimelockInvariants.STOX_GOVERNANCE_TIMELOCK;
-        if (basePin != address(0)) {
-            assertEq(basePin, LibTimelockInvariants.expectedTimelockAddress(LibSafeInvariants.STOX_TOKEN_OWNER_SAFE));
-        }
-        address ethereumPin = LibTimelockInvariants.STOX_GOVERNANCE_TIMELOCK_ETHEREUM;
-        if (ethereumPin != address(0)) {
-            assertEq(
-                ethereumPin,
-                LibTimelockInvariants.expectedTimelockAddress(LibSafeInvariants.STOX_TOKEN_OWNER_SAFE_ETHEREUM)
-            );
-        }
-        address hyperevmPin = LibTimelockInvariants.STOX_GOVERNANCE_TIMELOCK_HYPEREVM;
-        if (hyperevmPin != address(0)) {
-            assertEq(
-                hyperevmPin,
-                LibTimelockInvariants.expectedTimelockAddress(LibSafeInvariants.STOX_TOKEN_OWNER_SAFE_HYPEREVM)
-            );
-        }
+    /// @notice Every per-chain pin equals the Zoltu address derived from the
+    /// frozen creation code and that chain's Safe — UNCONDITIONALLY. The
+    /// not-zero guards that let this test ride through the hydration window
+    /// are retired with it: all three deploys have executed and the pins are
+    /// deploy history, so a zeroed or drifted pin must fail loudly here
+    /// rather than silently skip. A future chain's placeholder phase gets
+    /// its own guarded branch when its arm is added; these three never go
+    /// back.
+    function testPinsMatchDerivedAddresses() external pure {
+        assertEq(
+            LibTimelockInvariants.STOX_GOVERNANCE_TIMELOCK,
+            LibTimelockInvariants.expectedTimelockAddress(LibSafeInvariants.STOX_TOKEN_OWNER_SAFE)
+        );
+        assertEq(
+            LibTimelockInvariants.STOX_GOVERNANCE_TIMELOCK_ETHEREUM,
+            LibTimelockInvariants.expectedTimelockAddress(LibSafeInvariants.STOX_TOKEN_OWNER_SAFE_ETHEREUM)
+        );
+        assertEq(
+            LibTimelockInvariants.STOX_GOVERNANCE_TIMELOCK_HYPEREVM,
+            LibTimelockInvariants.expectedTimelockAddress(LibSafeInvariants.STOX_TOKEN_OWNER_SAFE_HYPEREVM)
+        );
     }
 
     /// @notice Every chain with a pinned token-owner Safe resolves through