From c50394b7ec955dfe7afc42de082b0d8e18e28e2f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: WilcoLouwerse Date: Tue, 8 Sep 2026 15:41:48 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 1/3] fix(global-settings): destructive guard borrowed its verb from another command MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The destructive/in-place guard's gap pattern was [^|]*, which stops at a pipe but spans `;` and `&&` freely. So the tool name, its -i flag and the protected path could each come from a DIFFERENT command in the same chain: awk '{print}' /tmp/x; grep -c -i needle ~/.claude/hooks/foo.sh was hard-denied as an "in-place edit" — `awk` from command one, ` -i` from `grep -c -i` in command two, and the protected path from that same second command. Nothing in-place happens anywhere. Same shape for the rm arm: rm /tmp/junk; cat ~/.claude/settings-version Both only READ the protected path. This bit during real work in this repo: a diagnostic that merely inspected ~/.claude/ was refused, with a reason describing an operation the command never attempted. It even blocked the first attempt to commit this very fix, because the examples above appear in the commit message. It fails closed, so there is no security exposure either way — the symptom is a refused read, never an allowed write. That is also why it went unnoticed for so long. Fix: anchor all three arms at a command-segment boundary (the rm arm already was) and keep the gap inside that segment, using [^|;&] instead of [^|]. A destructive verb aimed at a protected path always starts its own segment, so nothing genuine stops matching. The added controls cover the chained forms (`echo foo; sed -i ...`, `echo foo && truncate ...`) that the existing section-4 fixtures never exercised. Verified: the full guard suite is 7491/7491 with no existing fixture altered — the test file gains 25 lines and loses none. Against a standalone fixture set the unpatched hook scores 9/11 and the patched hook 11/11, the two deltas being exactly the false positives above. VERSION 2.4.1 -> 2.4.3. Skips 2.4.2 deliberately: PR #704 is taking that number, so this PR should merge after it. --- global-settings/VERSION | 2 +- global-settings/block-write-commands.sh | 14 ++++++++--- .../tests/test-block-write-commands.sh | 25 +++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/global-settings/VERSION b/global-settings/VERSION index 005119ba..35cee72d 100644 --- a/global-settings/VERSION +++ b/global-settings/VERSION @@ -1 +1 @@ -2.4.1 +2.4.3 diff --git a/global-settings/block-write-commands.sh b/global-settings/block-write-commands.sh index a0e3c31b..3f7e98ec 100644 --- a/global-settings/block-write-commands.sh +++ b/global-settings/block-write-commands.sh @@ -90,9 +90,17 @@ fi # have NO canonical path — they are never allowed. The only permitted operation is a full # overwrite sourced from the canonical repo (enforced by the write guard below). This is a # HARD BLOCK regardless of source, because these operations cannot carry canonical content. -if echo "$cmd" | grep -qE "\b(sed|perl|awk|gawk|ruby)\b[^|]*[[:space:]]-i\b[^|]*${_prot}" \ -|| echo "$cmd" | grep -qE "\b(truncate|shred|unlink)\b[^|]*${_prot}" \ -|| echo "$cmd" | grep -qE "(^|[;&|]\s*)rm\b[^|]*${_prot}"; then +# +# All three patterns anchor the tool name at a command-segment boundary and keep the +# gap up to the protected path inside that same segment ([^|;&] rather than [^|]). +# Without both, the tool name, its -i flag and the protected path could each be +# borrowed from a DIFFERENT command in the same chain: `awk '{print}' f; grep -c -i x +# ~/.claude/hooks/y.sh` was hard-denied as an "in-place edit" because [^|]* happily +# spans `;`, matching awk from the first command and -i from the third. Fails closed, +# so the symptom was a refused read-only inspection with a misleading reason. +if echo "$cmd" | grep -qE "(^|[;&|]\s*)(sed|perl|awk|gawk|ruby)\b[^|;&]*[[:space:]]-i\b[^|;&]*${_prot}" \ +|| echo "$cmd" | grep -qE "(^|[;&|]\s*)(truncate|shred|unlink)\b[^|;&]*${_prot}" \ +|| echo "$cmd" | grep -qE "(^|[;&|]\s*)rm\b[^|;&]*${_prot}"; then hard_deny "BLOCKED: in-place edits, truncation, or deletion of ~/.claude/ config files are not permitted. The only allowed operation is a full overwrite with canonical content from the configured source." fi diff --git a/global-settings/tests/test-block-write-commands.sh b/global-settings/tests/test-block-write-commands.sh index 321ed304..9b53196c 100644 --- a/global-settings/tests/test-block-write-commands.sh +++ b/global-settings/tests/test-block-write-commands.sh @@ -142,6 +142,31 @@ done add_allow "npm ci (lockfile-pinned)" "npm ci" add_allow "npm ci --ignore-scripts" "npm ci --ignore-scripts" +# Destructive/in-place guard — segment-boundary regressions. +# The guard's gap pattern used to be [^|]*, which stops at a pipe but happily spans +# `;` and `&&`. So the tool name, its -i flag and the protected path could each be +# borrowed from a DIFFERENT command in the same chain, and a read-only inspection got +# hard-denied as an "in-place edit". Every command below only ever READS the protected +# path; the destructive verb operates on an unprotected one. +FP_PROT_FILES=( "settings.json" "hooks/check-settings-version.sh" "settings-version" ) +for f in "${FP_PROT_FILES[@]}"; do + add_allow "segment-fp: awk earlier, unrelated -i later → $f" \ + "awk '{print}' /tmp/x; grep -c -i needle \"\$HOME/.claude/${f}\"" + add_allow "segment-fp: sed -i on an unprotected path → $f" \ + "sed -i 's/a/b/' /tmp/x; grep -c needle \"\$HOME/.claude/${f}\"" + add_allow "segment-fp: rm earlier on an unprotected path → $f" \ + "rm /tmp/junk; cat \"\$HOME/.claude/${f}\"" + add_allow "segment-fp: unlink earlier on an unprotected path → $f" \ + "unlink /tmp/junk && wc -l \"\$HOME/.claude/${f}\"" + # Controls: narrowing the gap must not let a genuine destructive op through, + # including one that sits after a command-chain prefix (section 4 below never + # exercises the chained form for in-place mutators). + add_deny "segment-fp control: chained sed -i → $f" \ + "echo foo; sed -i 's/a/b/' \"\$HOME/.claude/${f}\"" + add_deny "segment-fp control: chained truncate → $f" \ + "echo foo && truncate -s 0 \"\$HOME/.claude/${f}\"" +done + # ── DENY fixtures ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── # 1) Redirects: `>` and `>>` against every path variant. for op in '>' '>>'; do From 3b2279291391841d5551ae1c87666b487d9486ff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: WilcoLouwerse Date: Wed, 9 Sep 2026 00:27:41 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 2/3] =?UTF-8?q?fix(global-settings):=20drop=20the=20segmen?= =?UTF-8?q?t=20anchor=20=E2=80=94=20it=20removed=20real=20coverage?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Review of #720 found a genuine regression in my own fix. I had added `(^|[;&|]\s*)` to the sed/perl/awk/gawk/ruby and truncate/shred/unlink arms so all three would look alike. On main those two arms used a bare `\bverb\b` with no anchor, so adding one strictly REMOVED coverage: a destructive verb is not always at a command-segment start. These all mutate a protected path, were denied on main, and my anchored version let them through — `(`, `{`, a leading space and a wrapper word are not segment separators: (sed -i 's/a/b/' ~/.claude/settings.json) { sed -i 's/a/b/' ~/.claude/settings.json; } env sed -i 's/a/b/' ~/.claude/settings.json if true; then sed -i 's/a/b/' ~/.claude/settings.json; fi sed -i 's/a/b/' ~/.claude/settings.json # leading whitespace truncate -s 0 ~/.claude/settings-version My 18 segment-fp fixtures only covered the `;`/`&&` borrowing shape, so 7509/7509 gave zero signal on any of this. The suite agreed with me because I only asked it what I already believed. The false positive never needed the anchor. Narrowing the gap class from [^|] to [^|;&] is sufficient on its own: it forces the verb, its -i flag and the protected path into one segment, which is exactly the property that was missing. So this commit keeps the gap change and reverts the anchor on those two arms. The rm arm keeps its anchor — that was pre-existing on main, not something this branch introduced. Adds 30 non-segment-start DENY fixtures (10 shapes x 3 protected files) covering leading space, leading tab, subshell, brace group, env wrapper and if/then, across sed/truncate/unlink/shred, so the hole cannot reopen silently. Verified: full suite 7539/7539. On a 20-case adversarial fixture set the unpatched main hook scores 18/20 (failing exactly the two false positives) and this version scores 20/20 — both false positives fixed, all nine non-segment-start shapes still denied. Existing tests remain untouched. --- global-settings/block-write-commands.sh | 27 ++++++++++++------- .../tests/test-block-write-commands.sh | 23 ++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/global-settings/block-write-commands.sh b/global-settings/block-write-commands.sh index 3f7e98ec..673a995d 100644 --- a/global-settings/block-write-commands.sh +++ b/global-settings/block-write-commands.sh @@ -91,15 +91,24 @@ fi # overwrite sourced from the canonical repo (enforced by the write guard below). This is a # HARD BLOCK regardless of source, because these operations cannot carry canonical content. # -# All three patterns anchor the tool name at a command-segment boundary and keep the -# gap up to the protected path inside that same segment ([^|;&] rather than [^|]). -# Without both, the tool name, its -i flag and the protected path could each be -# borrowed from a DIFFERENT command in the same chain: `awk '{print}' f; grep -c -i x -# ~/.claude/hooks/y.sh` was hard-denied as an "in-place edit" because [^|]* happily -# spans `;`, matching awk from the first command and -i from the third. Fails closed, -# so the symptom was a refused read-only inspection with a misleading reason. -if echo "$cmd" | grep -qE "(^|[;&|]\s*)(sed|perl|awk|gawk|ruby)\b[^|;&]*[[:space:]]-i\b[^|;&]*${_prot}" \ -|| echo "$cmd" | grep -qE "(^|[;&|]\s*)(truncate|shred|unlink)\b[^|;&]*${_prot}" \ +# The gap classes are [^|;&] rather than [^|] so the tool name, its -i flag and the +# protected path must all sit in the SAME command segment. With the old [^|]* — which +# stops at a pipe but spans `;` and `&&` — they could each be borrowed from a +# DIFFERENT command in one chain, e.g. `awk '{print}' f; grep -c -i x +# ~/.claude/hooks/y.sh` was hard-denied as an "in-place edit" using awk from the +# first command and -i from the second. Fails closed, so the symptom was a refused +# read-only inspection with a misleading reason. +# +# Deliberately NOT anchored on the first two arms. Adding `(^|[;&|]\s*)` there looks +# tidier and matches the rm arm, but it strictly removes coverage: a genuine verb is +# not always at a segment start. ` sed -i … ~/.claude/x` (leading whitespace), +# `(sed -i … ~/.claude/x)`, `{ sed -i … ~/.claude/x; }`, `env sed -i … ~/.claude/x` +# and `if true; then sed -i … ~/.claude/x; fi` all stop matching, because `(`, `{` +# and a bare `^`-plus-space are not segment separators. Keep the bare \bverb\b match: +# narrowing the gap alone fixes the false positive without opening those holes. +# The rm arm keeps its anchor — that is pre-existing behaviour, not added here. +if echo "$cmd" | grep -qE "\b(sed|perl|awk|gawk|ruby)\b[^|;&]*[[:space:]]-i\b[^|;&]*${_prot}" \ +|| echo "$cmd" | grep -qE "\b(truncate|shred|unlink)\b[^|;&]*${_prot}" \ || echo "$cmd" | grep -qE "(^|[;&|]\s*)rm\b[^|;&]*${_prot}"; then hard_deny "BLOCKED: in-place edits, truncation, or deletion of ~/.claude/ config files are not permitted. The only allowed operation is a full overwrite with canonical content from the configured source." fi diff --git a/global-settings/tests/test-block-write-commands.sh b/global-settings/tests/test-block-write-commands.sh index c5c03ef0..913e1361 100644 --- a/global-settings/tests/test-block-write-commands.sh +++ b/global-settings/tests/test-block-write-commands.sh @@ -190,6 +190,29 @@ for f in "${FP_PROT_FILES[@]}"; do "echo foo && truncate -s 0 \"\$HOME/.claude/${f}\"" done +# Non-segment-start destructive verbs. These are the shapes that a +# `(^|[;&|]\s*)` anchor on the sed/perl/awk/gawk/ruby and truncate/shred/unlink +# arms would silently stop matching, because `(`, `{`, a leading space and a +# wrapper word are not command separators. The guard deliberately keeps a bare +# \bverb\b match on those two arms for exactly this reason — every command below +# genuinely mutates the protected path and must stay denied. +for f in "${FP_PROT_FILES[@]}"; do + for wrap in \ + " sed -i 's/a/b/' PATH" \ + " sed -i 's/a/b/' PATH" \ + "(sed -i 's/a/b/' PATH)" \ + "{ sed -i 's/a/b/' PATH; }" \ + "env sed -i 's/a/b/' PATH" \ + "if true; then sed -i 's/a/b/' PATH; fi" \ + " truncate -s 0 PATH" \ + "(truncate -s 0 PATH)" \ + "{ unlink PATH; }" \ + "env shred PATH"; do + add_deny "non-segment-start: ${wrap%% PATH*}… → $f" \ + "${wrap//PATH/\"\$HOME/.claude/${f}\"}" + done +done + # ── DENY fixtures ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── # 1) Redirects: `>` and `>>` against every path variant. for op in '>' '>>'; do From 5cd96b9bddaee8004b7b4949dfa84b7621b25ac6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: WilcoLouwerse Date: Wed, 9 Sep 2026 01:48:01 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 3/3] fix(global-settings): narrow only the verb-to-flag gap, nothing else MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Second regression found in review of my own fix, and a worse one than the first. Narrowing every gap to [^|;&] assumed a `;` is always a command separator. This guard is plain text matching with no shell awareness, so it cannot tell a separator from the same character inside a quoted argument: sed -i "s/a/b/;s/c/d/" ~/.claude/settings.json perl -i -pe 's/a/b/;s/c/d/' ~/.claude/settings.json gawk -i inplace '{a=1;print}' ~/.claude/settings.json All three are ordinary idioms — chaining two substitutions in one script — and all three are denied on main. My version let them through. For sed the generic `sed -i` rule downgrades it to an approval prompt; for perl, awk, truncate and unlink there is no fallback rule at all, so it was a silent ALLOW of a real in-place edit of a protected file. The false positive never needed a broad narrowing. It came from the verb and the -i flag belonging to DIFFERENT commands, so the only gap that has to be constrained is the one BETWEEN them — and a `;` or `&` can never legitimately sit between a command name and its own flag. Every gap that precedes ${_prot} stays [^|]*, because that is where a quoted separator does legitimately appear. Net effect against main: one character class, on one arm, in one position. The truncate/shred/unlink and rm arms are now byte-identical to main again. That leaves two false positives unfixed — `rm /tmp/junk; cat ~/.claude/settings-version` and `sed -i … /tmp/x; grep … ~/.claude/x`. Both need the guard to know where one command ends, which regex cannot do without reintroducing the hole above. They fail CLOSED: a refused read, never an allowed write. That is the right side to err on, and the comment block now says so explicitly so the next person does not "fix" it again. Fixtures reworked to match: dropped the three that asserted the now-unfixed false positives, kept the verb/-i one, and added 18 covering separators inside quoted arguments (6 shapes x 3 files) alongside the 30 non-segment-start cases. Verified: full suite 7548/7548. On a 24-case adversarial set main scores 23/24 (failing only the verb/-i false positive) and this version 24/24 — every bypass and every non-segment-start shape denied. Existing tests untouched. --- global-settings/block-write-commands.sh | 48 +++++++++++------- .../tests/test-block-write-commands.sh | 50 ++++++++++++------- 2 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-) diff --git a/global-settings/block-write-commands.sh b/global-settings/block-write-commands.sh index 673a995d..168d6cdc 100644 --- a/global-settings/block-write-commands.sh +++ b/global-settings/block-write-commands.sh @@ -91,25 +91,37 @@ fi # overwrite sourced from the canonical repo (enforced by the write guard below). This is a # HARD BLOCK regardless of source, because these operations cannot carry canonical content. # -# The gap classes are [^|;&] rather than [^|] so the tool name, its -i flag and the -# protected path must all sit in the SAME command segment. With the old [^|]* — which -# stops at a pipe but spans `;` and `&&` — they could each be borrowed from a -# DIFFERENT command in one chain, e.g. `awk '{print}' f; grep -c -i x -# ~/.claude/hooks/y.sh` was hard-denied as an "in-place edit" using awk from the -# first command and -i from the second. Fails closed, so the symptom was a refused -# read-only inspection with a misleading reason. +# Exactly ONE thing differs from the long-standing form: on the first arm, the gap +# between the tool name and its -i flag is [^|;&]* instead of [^|]*. That closes a +# false positive where the verb and the flag came from DIFFERENT commands in one +# chain — `awk '{print}' f; grep -c -i x ~/.claude/hooks/y.sh` was hard-denied as an +# "in-place edit" using awk from the first command and -i from the second. A `;` or +# `&` can never legitimately sit between a command name and its own flag, so +# narrowing there costs no coverage. # -# Deliberately NOT anchored on the first two arms. Adding `(^|[;&|]\s*)` there looks -# tidier and matches the rm arm, but it strictly removes coverage: a genuine verb is -# not always at a segment start. ` sed -i … ~/.claude/x` (leading whitespace), -# `(sed -i … ~/.claude/x)`, `{ sed -i … ~/.claude/x; }`, `env sed -i … ~/.claude/x` -# and `if true; then sed -i … ~/.claude/x; fi` all stop matching, because `(`, `{` -# and a bare `^`-plus-space are not segment separators. Keep the bare \bverb\b match: -# narrowing the gap alone fixes the false positive without opening those holes. -# The rm arm keeps its anchor — that is pre-existing behaviour, not added here. -if echo "$cmd" | grep -qE "\b(sed|perl|awk|gawk|ruby)\b[^|;&]*[[:space:]]-i\b[^|;&]*${_prot}" \ -|| echo "$cmd" | grep -qE "\b(truncate|shred|unlink)\b[^|;&]*${_prot}" \ -|| echo "$cmd" | grep -qE "(^|[;&|]\s*)rm\b[^|;&]*${_prot}"; then +# Everything else is left exactly as it was, and both temptations to "tidy up" are +# deliberately resisted: +# +# 1. Do NOT anchor the first two arms with `(^|[;&|]\s*)` to match the rm arm. +# A genuine verb is often not at a segment start: ` sed -i … ~/.claude/x`, +# `(sed -i … ~/.claude/x)`, `{ sed -i … ~/.claude/x; }`, `env sed -i …` and +# `if true; then sed -i …; fi` all stop matching, because `(`, `{` and a bare +# leading space are not separators. +# +# 2. Do NOT narrow the gap that precedes ${_prot} on any arm. This guard is plain +# text matching with no shell awareness, so it cannot tell a command separator +# from the same character inside a quoted argument. `sed -i "s/a/b/;s/c/d/" +# ~/.claude/settings.json` is an ordinary two-substitution sed script; with a +# narrowed gap it stops matching and — for perl/awk/truncate/unlink, which have +# no generic fallback rule — becomes a silent ALLOW of a real in-place edit. +# +# The residual false positives (`rm /tmp/junk; cat ~/.claude/settings-version`, and +# `sed -i … /tmp/x; grep … ~/.claude/x`) are the price of that. They fail CLOSED — a +# refused read, never an allowed write — and cannot be fixed at the regex level +# without opening the fail-open hole above. Fixing them needs real shell parsing. +if echo "$cmd" | grep -qE "\b(sed|perl|awk|gawk|ruby)\b[^|;&]*[[:space:]]-i\b[^|]*${_prot}" \ +|| echo "$cmd" | grep -qE "\b(truncate|shred|unlink)\b[^|]*${_prot}" \ +|| echo "$cmd" | grep -qE "(^|[;&|]\s*)rm\b[^|]*${_prot}"; then hard_deny "BLOCKED: in-place edits, truncation, or deletion of ~/.claude/ config files are not permitted. The only allowed operation is a full overwrite with canonical content from the configured source." fi diff --git a/global-settings/tests/test-block-write-commands.sh b/global-settings/tests/test-block-write-commands.sh index 913e1361..6c308e71 100644 --- a/global-settings/tests/test-block-write-commands.sh +++ b/global-settings/tests/test-block-write-commands.sh @@ -165,31 +165,45 @@ done add_allow "npm ci (lockfile-pinned)" "npm ci" add_allow "npm ci --ignore-scripts" "npm ci --ignore-scripts" -# Destructive/in-place guard — segment-boundary regressions. -# The guard's gap pattern used to be [^|]*, which stops at a pipe but happily spans -# `;` and `&&`. So the tool name, its -i flag and the protected path could each be -# borrowed from a DIFFERENT command in the same chain, and a read-only inspection got -# hard-denied as an "in-place edit". Every command below only ever READS the protected -# path; the destructive verb operates on an unprotected one. +# Destructive/in-place guard — the verb and its -i flag must come from the SAME +# command. The gap between them used to be [^|]*, which stops at a pipe but spans +# `;` and `&&`, so the guard could pair a verb from one command with a `-i` from +# another and hard-deny a read-only inspection as an "in-place edit". The command +# below only READS the protected path; `awk` and the `-i` belong to different +# commands and neither touches it. FP_PROT_FILES=( "settings.json" "hooks/check-settings-version.sh" "settings-version" ) for f in "${FP_PROT_FILES[@]}"; do - add_allow "segment-fp: awk earlier, unrelated -i later → $f" \ + add_allow "verb/-i from different commands → $f" \ "awk '{print}' /tmp/x; grep -c -i needle \"\$HOME/.claude/${f}\"" - add_allow "segment-fp: sed -i on an unprotected path → $f" \ - "sed -i 's/a/b/' /tmp/x; grep -c needle \"\$HOME/.claude/${f}\"" - add_allow "segment-fp: rm earlier on an unprotected path → $f" \ - "rm /tmp/junk; cat \"\$HOME/.claude/${f}\"" - add_allow "segment-fp: unlink earlier on an unprotected path → $f" \ - "unlink /tmp/junk && wc -l \"\$HOME/.claude/${f}\"" - # Controls: narrowing the gap must not let a genuine destructive op through, - # including one that sits after a command-chain prefix (section 4 below never - # exercises the chained form for in-place mutators). - add_deny "segment-fp control: chained sed -i → $f" \ + # Controls: the narrowing must not let a genuine destructive op through, + # including one after a command-chain prefix (section 4 below never exercises + # the chained form for in-place mutators). + add_deny "control: chained sed -i → $f" \ "echo foo; sed -i 's/a/b/' \"\$HOME/.claude/${f}\"" - add_deny "segment-fp control: chained truncate → $f" \ + add_deny "control: chained truncate → $f" \ "echo foo && truncate -s 0 \"\$HOME/.claude/${f}\"" done +# Separator characters inside a QUOTED ARGUMENT. This guard is plain text matching +# with no shell awareness, so it cannot tell a real command separator from the same +# character inside an argument. Narrowing the gap that precedes the protected path +# would make every command below stop matching — and for perl/awk/truncate/unlink, +# which have no generic fallback rule, that is a silent ALLOW of a real in-place +# edit. `sed -i "s/a/b/;s/c/d/" ` is an ordinary two-substitution script, not +# a contrived evasion. These must stay denied. +for f in "${FP_PROT_FILES[@]}"; do + for wrap in \ + "sed -i \"s/a/b/;s/c/d/\" PATH" \ + "perl -i -pe 's/a/b/;s/c/d/' PATH" \ + "gawk -i inplace '{a=1;print}' PATH" \ + "sed -i 's/a/b/' \"x&&y\" PATH" \ + "truncate -s 0 \"a;b\" PATH" \ + "rm \"a;b\" PATH"; do + add_deny "separator inside a quoted arg: ${wrap%% PATH*}… → $f" \ + "${wrap//PATH/\"\$HOME/.claude/${f}\"}" + done +done + # Non-segment-start destructive verbs. These are the shapes that a # `(^|[;&|]\s*)` anchor on the sed/perl/awk/gawk/ruby and truncate/shred/unlink # arms would silently stop matching, because `(`, `{`, a leading space and a