diff --git a/lib/request-processor/handle_urls.go b/lib/request-processor/handle_urls.go
index 7ce058eed..f8fe847cb 100644
--- a/lib/request-processor/handle_urls.go
+++ b/lib/request-processor/handle_urls.go
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ import (
 - direct SSRF attacks (hostname that resolves directly to a local IP address - does not go through redirects)
 - direct IMDS SSRF attacks (hostname is an IMDS IP)
 - blocked outbound domains (based on cloud configuration)
+- redirect-based SSRF via domain allowlisting (prevents requests to non-allowlisted domains)
 
 All these checks first verify if the hostname was provided via user input.
 Protects both curl and fopen wrapper functions (file_get_contents, etc...).
@@ -42,7 +43,15 @@ func OnPreOutgoingRequest(instance *instance.RequestProcessorInstance) string {
 		return ""
 	}
 
-	res := ssrf.CheckContextForSSRF(instance, hostname, port, operation)
+	// Check domain allowlist for stream wrappers to prevent SSRF via redirects
+	// Stream wrappers (file_get_contents, fopen, file) cannot provide effective URL after redirects,
+	// so we require explicit domain allowlisting when the URL is user-controlled
+	res := ssrf.CheckDomainAllowlistForStreamWrappers(instance, hostname, port, operation)
+	if res != nil {
+		return attack.ReportAttackDetected(res, instance)
+	}
+
+	res = ssrf.CheckContextForSSRF(instance, hostname, port, operation)
 	if res != nil {
 		return attack.ReportAttackDetected(res, instance)
 	}
diff --git a/lib/request-processor/vulnerabilities/ssrf/checkDomainAllowlist.go b/lib/request-processor/vulnerabilities/ssrf/checkDomainAllowlist.go
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6c8a702c8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/request-processor/vulnerabilities/ssrf/checkDomainAllowlist.go
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+package ssrf
+
+import (
+	. "main/aikido_types"
+	"main/context"
+	"main/helpers"
+	"main/instance"
+	"main/utils"
+)
+
+// allowedDomains defines the list of domains that are allowed for outgoing HTTP requests
+// from PHP stream wrappers (file_get_contents, fopen, file) when the URL is user-controlled.
+// This prevents SSRF attacks via redirects to internal addresses, which cannot be detected
+// for stream wrappers (unlike curl which provides the effective URL after redirects).
+var allowedDomains = []string{"example.com"} // add your allowed domains here
+
+// CheckDomainAllowlistForStreamWrappers validates that the requested hostname is in the allowlist
+// for PHP stream wrapper functions that cannot detect redirects.
+// This is the primary defense against redirect-based SSRF for stream wrappers.
+// Returns an InterceptorResult if the domain is not allowed, nil otherwise.
+func CheckDomainAllowlistForStreamWrappers(instance *instance.RequestProcessorInstance, hostname string, port uint32, operation string) *utils.InterceptorResult {
+	// Only apply this check to stream wrapper functions that cannot detect redirects
+	// curl is handled separately and can detect redirects via CURLINFO_EFFECTIVE_URL
+	isStreamWrapper := operation == "file" || operation == "file_get_contents" || operation == "fopen"
+	if !isStreamWrapper {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	// Check if hostname was provided via user input
+	hostnameFoundInUserInput := false
+	var matchedSource string
+	var matchedPath string
+	var matchedPayload string
+
+	for _, source := range context.SOURCES {
+		mapss := source.CacheGet(instance)
+		for str, path := range mapss {
+			// Use the same hostname matching logic as findHostnameInUserInput
+			if findHostnameInUserInput(str, hostname, port) {
+				hostnameFoundInUserInput = true
+				matchedSource = source.Name
+				matchedPath = path
+				matchedPayload = str
+				break
+			}
+		}
+		if hostnameFoundInUserInput {
+			break
+		}
+	}
+
+	// If hostname was not found in user input, no SSRF risk
+	if !hostnameFoundInUserInput {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	// Normalize the hostname for comparison
+	normalizedHostname := helpers.NormalizeHostname(hostname)
+
+	// Check if domain is in the allowlist (exact match only)
+	for _, allowedDomain := range allowedDomains {
+		normalizedAllowed := helpers.NormalizeHostname(allowedDomain)
+		if normalizedHostname == normalizedAllowed {
+			// Domain is explicitly allowed
+			return nil
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Check if domain is explicitly allowed in cloud configuration
+	var server *ServerData
+	if instance != nil {
+		server = instance.GetCurrentServer()
+	}
+	if server != nil {
+		server.CloudConfigMutex.Lock()
+		block, found := server.CloudConfig.OutboundDomains[normalizedHostname]
+		server.CloudConfigMutex.Unlock()
+
+		if found && !block {
+			// Domain is explicitly allowed in cloud config
+			return nil
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Domain is not in allowlist - block the request to prevent redirect-based SSRF
+	return &utils.InterceptorResult{
+		Operation:     operation,
+		Kind:          utils.Ssrf,
+		Source:        matchedSource,
+		PathToPayload: matchedPath,
+		Metadata: map[string]string{
+			"hostname":                hostname,
+			"blockedByAllowlist":      "true",
+			"reason":                  "redirect_protection",
+			"streamWrapperFunction":   operation,
+		},
+		Payload: matchedPayload,
+	}
+}